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Soyeun Kim, Simon Lightfoot
European Foreign Affairs Review
Volume 22, Issue 2 (2017) pp. 159 – 175
https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2017010
Abstract
The EU is a major donor of development aid, so it can be argued to have a major role in shaping global development norms. By examining the EU normative leadership role in the Busan Forum on Aid Effectiveness using four leadership categories we argue that the EU could be seen to be playing a more subtle leadership role than in previous aid summits, reflecting some issues regarding the ability of the EU to construct and support unified agendas in this field, but also showing some evidence of having learnt from other international summits, such as the Copenhagen climate change summit, and adapting its position towards the emerging donors accordingly. This case study both inform our understanding of the EU’s global leadership in development aid but also adds to the growing literature on the EU’s relations with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) and the relationship between the DAC and the so-called Non-DAC donors.
Extract
Why does regulatory change occur much more slowly in some jurisdictions than in others? In this article, we look at the gradualist pace of Hong Kong’s corporate governance-related regulatory reform – particularly with regard to shareholder protection. We extend the concept of ‘legal transactions costs’ to explain such slow change. Costs of learning, experimenting and satisfying various constituencies about the advantages to their own interests of such reform represent some of these legal transactions costs. We describe how such legal transactions costs have worked against the creation of a minority shareholders’ association, the professionalization of board-directorships and the incorporation of soft law provisions in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s Listing Rules into hard law. We describe what the end result of such reform might look like – to assess the gap between current and possibly reformed corporate governance.
Business Law Review