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Tobias H. Tröger, Anastasia Kotovskaia
European Business Law Review
Volume 34, Issue 5 (2023) pp. 781 – 800
https://doi.org/10.54648/eulr2023038
Abstract
We investigate whether the bank crisis management framework of the European banking union can effectively bar the detrimental influence of national interests in cross-border bank failures. We find that both the internal governance structure and decision-making procedure of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the interplay between the SRB and national resolution authorities in the implementation of supranationally devised resolution schemes provide inroads that allow opposing national interests to obstruct supranational resolution. The amendments to the framework recently proposed by the European Commission would not alter the assessment materially. We also show that the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), even after the ratification of the reform of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the introduction of the SRF backstop facility, is inapt to overcome these frictions. We propose a full supranationalization of resolution decision-making. This would allow European authorities in charge of bank crisis management to operate autonomously and achieve socially optimal outcomes beyond national borders.
Keywords
SRB, SRF, SRM, bank resolution, banking union, bail-in, ESM, national interest, political economy, bureaucrats’ incentives
Extract
This article provides an update and critical assessment of EU action in the Middle-East and North Africa (MENA), a region frequently referred as to the European Southern Neighbourhood. It examines the different instruments and approaches, which are put at work by a variety of institutional actors (EU Commission, Directorate-Generals (DGs), Development Cooperation (DEVCO), EU’s Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR); as well as the EEAS and the Member States), and which in their combination are shaping the EU’s MENA policy. The particular focus is on the politico-organizational interplay between the EU’s institutional architecture, and the effects of EU policies on the political order in the Middle-East and the ArabWorld. The questions are: What can we reasonably expect from EU external action in MENA? Does EU foreign policy-making at all affect power and governance structures in the MENA region? To what extent, and under what conditions is the EU likely to contribute to promoting democracy and stability? Adopting a case study research strategy, the article analyses the design and implementation of individual policy issues in the areas of security, crisis management, international cooperation and development, and studies the effects thereof in three countries within the region. Based on document review, interviews with policy makers and direct observation, taking into account the local context in recipient countries, as well as the regional and geopolitical dimension, the article contributes to empirical research on EU action in a global hotspot area, undergoing turbulence and violent transformation. Results point to an overstrained Europe, ill-prepared underperforming in the face of the colossal challenges in a radically transformed socio-political and security context. The consequence has been a series of uncoordinated ad-hoc actions by individual member states and the general sense of disunity.
European Foreign Affairs Review