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Leopoldo Parada
Intertax
Volume 47, Issue 1 (2019) pp. 24 – 54
https://doi.org/10.54648/taxi2019003
Abstract
The OECD pragmatic approach regarding hybrid entity mismatches is, without doubt, questionable. However, equally questionable is the absence of alternatives solutions proposed by either academics or tax policy makers , which demonstrates a sort of conformism as regards both the diagnosis of the problems and the solutions thereto, as if matching tax outcomes and taxing income somewhere – no matter where – were indeed the only possible path to deal with hybrid entity mismatches.
In an attempt to break this inertia, this article argues for coordination in the tax characterization of entities as a straightforward and suitable alternative to replace the current OECD linking rules, and perhaps also, the consequentialist OECD approach to hybrid entity mismatches. For this purpose, three specific alternatives are explored for coordination in the tax characterization of entities, which include (1) supremacy of the tax characterization rules of the source state, (2) supremacy of the tax characterization rules of the residence state and (3) supremacy of the tax characterization rules of the home state. The analysis of these alternatives includes both hypotheticals and specific examples from domestic and supranational laws that are used to illustrate and support their effectiveness. The ultimate aim of this article is to demonstrate that coordination in the tax characterization of entities appears to be not only a more preferable path when compared to the OECD approach of matching tax outcomes, but also a more coherent and less costly alternative for both taxpayers and tax administrations.
Extract
Abstract: A classic legal problem is whether breach of contract may give rise to a remedy. Under common law this is discussed under the doctrine of excuses. Its civil lawequivalent is the attributability of causes of non-performance of an obligation, and its converse, force majeure. Despite the variety of approaches in various jurisdictions, the general outlines are roughly equivalent as far as translation into smart contracts is concerned: the main issue is what is the cause of non-performance and whether this cause can be attributed.
Smart contracts can deal with the general outline of this structure, but may in practice only approximate the refinement that contract law offers. Themain problems are: determining the actual cause of the non-performance by means of automated oracles or the smart contract on its own (without relying on human judgment), dealing with multiple causality and impediments due to the creditor, determining attributability of the cause of non-performance. Smart contracts may offer no more than an approximation of the detailed rules of contract law, by hard-and-fast rules. This may suffice for certain categories of contracts, but may need additional effort to obtain a closer approximation of contract law rules where larger interests are concerned. The related doctrine of withholding performance is similarly difficult to realize appropriately in smart contracts. As regards hardship or unforeseen circumstances, it is best to disallow this in smart contracts,which leaves open the questionwhether partiesmight go to court for relief. The reliance on oracles furthermore opens a weakness to the automatic performance of smart contracts, due to possible liability of oracles for perceived incorrect assessment.
European Review of Private Law