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Alysia Blackham
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations
Volume 34, Issue 4 (2018) pp. 413 – 434
https://doi.org/10.54648/ijcl2018019
Abstract
As the world of work moves to increasingly precarious, temporary and insecure forms of labour, traditional forms of work regulation are becoming less relevant for the ‘gig economy’. Equality law has traditionally been framed as protecting ‘employees’ (and now ‘workers’) against acts of discrimination by ‘employers’. As these categories become increasingly remote from the lived experience of work, the relevance and potential of equality law to secure individual employment rights becomes increasingly limited. Drawing on comparative legal doctrinal analysis of the UK and Australia, this article considers options and new approaches for protecting workers from discrimination in new forms of employment, canvassing ideas such as the extension of equalitylaw to non-traditional workers, collectivized approaches to individual protection, and the use of positive duties to regulate the gig economy. This article questions the basic relevance and structuring of equality law for new forms of work. If equality law is to remain relevant and effective, serious changes are required to how it is conceived, framed and promoted. Merely extending existing ideas of ‘equality law’ to new forms of work will not respond to fundamental shifts in the labour market: there is a need to rethink and retheorize the role and purpose of equality law
Extract
Among the responses to the Brexit Referendum result on 23 June 2016 one issue was noticeably absent: the implications from a WTO perspective. Leaders have tried to reassure the world that the UK would be at least as good a WTO Member as during its 43 years under the EU umbrella. Some have argued that, the UK could simply take back its place which it had partly relinquished upon its accession to the EU in 1973. Instead, a UK divorce from the EU will inevitably require a re-balancing of the rights and obligations under the traffic rules of the WTO. Taking the examples of country-specific agricultural import quotas and of farm subsidy limits, it shows that farmers and businesses will find different market access rights after Brexit. Even a remote possibility of impairments will lead other club members to safeguard their own rights when signposts are shifted. The key question then is in the procedure for handling claims of reduced access opportunities: does the consensus principle imply that anybody can block any change in that balance?
Global Trade and Customs Journal