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Andrew Grainger
Journal of World Trade
Volume 45, Issue 1 (2011) pp. 39 – 62
https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2011002
Abstract
With falling tariff levels, it is probably not surprising that the non-tariff area and trade facilitation, in particular, are receiving growing attention. Apart from the World Trade Organization (WTO), trade facilitation is a subject of substance within a wide range of international organizations including several United Nations (UN)-type bodies, the World Customs Organization (WCO) as well as those concerned with economic development, supply chain security, and sector-specific issues such as international transport and logistics. The resulting body of international trade facilitation instruments and initiatives, which include conventions as well as detailed technical recommendations, is extensive. This article provides a general review of key elements and topics that are associated with trade facilitation and sets them against underlying challenges and obstacles in practice as well as for research. While much of the current effort in trade facilitation begins with a top-down premise – whereby governments seek to implement international conventions and recommendations nationally – the author argues that trade facilitation is inherently an operations-focused topic and deserves to be approached from a bottom-up approach, too. Such approach not only provides a strong case for an interdisciplinary research agenda, it also brings into question whether current institutions concerned with trade facilitation have the necessary capabilities to apply themselves to the more operational aspects associated with international trade.
Extract
Traditionally, most international tax disputes among jurisdictions have been resolved through the mechanism of the mutual agreement procedure (MAP). A long-standing concern with MAPs is that competent authorities might pursue a so-called package deal, whereby a certain taxpayer’s interests would be sacrificed as part of a larger trade-off between the competent authorities. This article argues that, contrary to this common belief, a package deal under the MAP is not necessarily a bad deal; indeed, it even has the potential to strengthen the MAP mechanism. Specifically, this package deal method helps to reduce the average costs of handling MAP cases; expands the space for cooperation between competent authorities; and, if properly devised, helps to foster a stable fiscal climate. In a broader sense, the method of package negotiation also has implications for the mechanism of international tax mediation. This article adopts an interdisciplinary approach, combining the topic of the MAP with transaction cost theory.
Intertax