Although anti-dumping
(AD) and countervailing (CVD) measures are presented as legitimate instruments
to restore fair competition in the multilateral trading system, their implementation
often reveals structural imbalances and strategic distortions. This two-part
study examines the extent to which certain WTO Members may be misusing these
instruments for protectionist purposes. Part 1 provides a qualitative analysis
of the legal and procedural flexibility embedded in the AD and SCM Agreements.
It highlights the discretionary powers granted to national investigating
authorities, the limits of dispute settlement oversight, and the risk of
undermining the conventional balance struck in 1994. Part 2 complements this
analysis with empirical data covering all AD and CVD procedures notified to the
WTO between 1995 and 2023. The data show a significant concentration of
measures against a limited number of targeted Members and sectors, which
implies a tendency for certain Members to abuse this prerogative for purely
protectionist purposes.