Although anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing (CVD) measures
are presented as legitimate instruments to restore fair competition in the
multilateral trading system, their implementation often reveals structural
imbalances and strategic distortions. This two-part study examines the extent
to which certain WTO Members may be misusing these instruments for
protectionist purposes. Part 1 provides a qualitative analysis of the legal and
procedural flexibility embedded in the anti-dumping and the Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreements. It highlights the discretionary
powers granted to national investigating authorities, the limits of dispute
settlement oversight, and the risk of undermining the conventional balance
struck in 1994. Part 2 complements this analysis with empirical data covering
all AD and CVD procedures notified to the WTO between 1995 and 2023. The data
show a significant concentration of measures against a limited number of
targeted Members and sectors, which implies a tendency for certain Members to
abuse this prerogative for purely protectionist purposes.