

Subject Index

A

Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA)

FDC Act, 628

Indian Firms up to 2009, 628, 629

Administrability and business certainty in

abuse of dominance

Competition Act, 273–74

competition legislation, 274

competition rules, 297

competitive process, 299

degree of dominance, 298–99

dominant firm, 299–300

economic approach and developing

countries

analytical frameworks, 280–81

buyers, 278–79

competition tests, 276

customer base, 280

dominant firms, 277

entrenched quasi-monopolies, 277

European economy, 276

exclusionary strategy, 279

factors affects, likelihood of abuse,
277–78

incumbent, 278

Intel and Cardiff Buses cases, 280

issues, current price, 278

markets, 280

Microsoft cases, 280

quasi-monopoly, 278

rules, application, 281

scale economies, 279–80

South Korea rivalrous contests, 277

theories and strategies, 280

enforcement successes, 300

evaluation of firm conduct, 298

exclusionary abuse

general prohibition, 293–95

price discrimination, 296–97

Tribunal establishment, 287–92

exclusionary theories of harm, 297

international debates and perceived ‘best
practice’, 274

motivation and intent, 299

multinational firms, 297

Provisions Of South African

Competition Act, 274–75

risks of over-enforcement, 298

South African record

effects-based tests, 286

Harmony Gold v. Mittal Steel, 286

legalistic procedure, 286

Nationwide Poles v. Sasol, 286

1 September 1999 to 31 August 2011,
282–85

settlement of the Commission, 285

State-ownership and/or support,
286–87

Tribunal case number, 281–82

strong emphasis, 274

treatment of ‘margin squeeze’, 298

Antitrust Division (AD), 143, 152–53
 Appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC), 246
 Article 102 TFEU
 description, 55–56
 objectives, 56–57
 sliding scale of market power, 57–59

C

Centralized model, 97–98
 Collective dominance and abuse,
 competition law of the Russian Federation
 antitrust enforcement, 256–58
 application of the legal regulation
 Aeroflot case, 267
 Art. 5, part 3 of the Law, 263
 cases alleging of abuse, 266
 competitors, 266
 excessive price, 266–67
 FAS and regional subdivisions, 259–62
 Gazprom Neft-Kuzbass, Barrel and ‘Center’ Company, 267
 indicators of, 263
 Krasnoyarsknefteproduct case, 267
 LUKOIL-Severo-Zapadnefteprodukt case, 267
 market of oil products, 268–71
 market shares, 263
 product market, 264–65
 restrictions on information, 258
 ‘stability of market shares’, 263–64
 conscious parallelism and tacit collusion
 Airtours, 253
 Art.102, 254
 Commission, 254
 Ethyl and *DuPont* cases, 255
 European Union, 253
 Federal Trade Commission, 255
 Flat Glass, 253
 Gencor, 253
 jurisdictions, 255

Korean Fair Trade Commission, 255–56
 parallel behaviour, 255
 prohibition mergers, 253–54
 United States, 254
 enforcement and litigation, 272
 Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS), 250
 market characteristics, 249–50
 recommended strategy, 271
 in Russian Antimonopoly Law, 250–52
 Collective Redress in EU Competition Law
 ‘abuse of process’, 557
 admissibility and class certification in antitrust cases
 appraisal of the ‘predominance’, 537–38
 Blades v. Monsanto, 539–40
 Catfish Antitrust Litigation, 538–39
 ‘cautious’ approach, 539
 certification appraisal, courts, 537
 District Court for Missouri, 538
 District Court’s certification, 542–43
 Hydrogen Peroxide, 542, 544
 ‘meticulous’ review, 538
 New Motor Vehicle, 540–41
 section 4 of the Clayton Act, 536–37
 Telephone Charges, 539–40
 US federal Courts, 545
 European Commission, 529–30, 558
 evolution of the EU agenda for group actions, 532–34
 named plaintiff and class counsel in class certification, 545–48
 ‘opt out’ actions and collective antitrust complaints
 application of Rule 23(b)(3) to antitrust cases, 548–49
 collective actions in EU competition law, 549–55
 ‘out of the particular’, 556
 procedural limits and safeguards, 557

- Rule 23 of the US Rules of Civil Procedure, 530–31
- ‘scrupulous’ certification inquiry, 557–58
- ‘transplantation’ of opt-out class actions, 531–32
- US federal courts and class certification in antitrust cases, 534–36
- Company Directors Disqualification Act (CDDA), 89, 90
- Competition Commission of Singapore’s (CCs) in Enforcement of Singapore’s Competition Act 2004
 - anti-competitive agreements, 302
 - coach operators and trade association, price-fixing and appeal, 305–07
 - competition regime, 301–02
 - deterrence objective in antitrust enforcement, 321–23
 - electrical and building works companies, bid-rigging, 307–09
 - financial penalties and leniency programme
 - aggravating/mitigating factors, 319–20
 - benefit of total immunity, 320–21
 - calculation, 312–13
 - duration of the infringement, 317–18
 - Electrical and Building Works case, 320
 - Guidelines on Penalty, 309, 314
 - relevant factors, 318–19
 - section 69(1)(d)(iii), 309
 - seriousness of infringement, 314–17
 - threshold condition, 310–12
 - United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading, 309–10
- pest control operators,
 - bid-rigging/collusive tendering, 303–05
- section 34 prohibits, 302–03
- United Kingdom’s Competition Act, 302
- Competition Disqualification Orders (CDOs), 90–92, 94, 97
- Competition Disqualification Undertakings (CDUs), 92–93, 98
- Competition Policy Advisory Group (COMPAG), 165–66
- Competition Policy Review Committee (CPRC), 166
- Costs and benefits of antitrust enforcement
 - comparison, 160–61
 - competition, protection
 - deadweight loss, 135–36
 - detrimental effects, 140
 - laissez-faire approaches, 135
 - market outcomes, economies, 139
 - price-cost margins, 139
 - private interest group theory, 137
 - public interest theory, 137
 - selective and episodic swings, 136
 - strategic (ab)uses, taxonomy, 137–38
 - ‘tendency for collusion’, 138
 - ‘tendency for monopolization’, 138
 - description, antitrust policy, 121–22
 - deterrence-based approach
 - deterrent effect of hard core cartel enforcement, 157–59
 - implementation of optimal sanctions, 155–57
 - survey-based methods, 159–60
- identification and measurement
 - administrative costs, 145
 - conceptual framework, 144–45
 - cost estimation, 46, 143–44
 - description, 162–63
 - direct costs, 142
 - FTC and AD, 143
 - indirect costs, 143
 - investigation object, 141
 - PWC survey, 145
- intervention-based approach
 - aggregate level, 147–150
 - disaggregate level, 150–54
- market power
 - deadweight loss, 123–25
 - definition, 123

- exercise of market power,
 - inefficiencies, 132–35
- productive inefficiencies, 131–32
- rent-seeking activities, 125–30

D

Decentralized model, 98–99

Diagnostics of competition law

- alleged discrimination against small
 - market companies, 639
- competition policy assessment, 638
- consumer surplus *v.* total surplus, 639
- efficiencies, 638–39
- market's external potential
 - competition and intra-industry
 - mobility, 638
- problem, 637–38
- remedies, 639

conflicting policy implications, 648–51

different schools of thought and lines of thinking

- Chicago School, 643–44
- economic theory, 641
- Harvard School, 642–43
- neoclassical theory, 641–42
- new synthesizing approaches, 646–48
- process-related views, 644–46

eclectic theory, 651–53

economic theory

- characteristic, 640
- discrimination argument, 640–41
- policy decision-making, 639–40

EU merger control, 635–36

extensive study of the economic theory, 657

implications of the economic-theoretic discussion

- assessment in practice, 654
- discrimination argument, theory and practice, 654
- efficiency arguments and surplus
 - standard, 656
- market concentration, 654–55

- market power, 654
- potential competition and
 - intra-industry mobility, 655–56
- relevant issues, 654
- remedies, 656–57

'small market problem', 636

theoretical discussion, 657–58

Dialectics of competition law

- autonomy, 358
- deontological perception of competition, 360

deontological values, 362

doctrinal camps, 356

empirical, 382–83

goals of antitrust, 362–63

ideological issues, 384

inside-the-box-thinking, 360

internalization of the welfare-centred values, 357

meta-goals, 358–59

methodological claim, 361

non-efficiency-based methods, 364

non-empirical deontological methods, 363–64

normative, 383

Ordo-Austrianism

- Austrian and Chicago School, 380

- collective right, 376–79

- deontological antitrust schools, 373–74

- empirical fact, 380–81

- individual right, 374–76

- normative claims, 380

- polarities, 374

- programmatic statements, 380

- State in protecting and enhancing the competitive process, 379–80

- workability, 381

regulatory limits, 355

sectoral policies, 357–58

socio-economic goals, 356

sports, 360–61

subordination, 358

testable data, 364

two-step balancing analysis, 359–60
 utilitarian perceptions of antitrust,
 356–57
 welfare-centred goals
 Bork's 'consumer welfare', 365–66
 Chicago School, 366
 competitive balance, 368–73
 consumer and total welfare, 365
 neoclassical economic perspective, 367
 normative premises and workable
 competition, 368
 yardstick of welfare/efficiency, 363
 Drugs Price Control Order (DPCO), 626

E

Economic Advisory Group on
 Competition Policy (EAGCP),
 208–09
 Economic downturn for cartels and
 enforcement
 antitrust fines, bankruptcy, 518–20
 cartel agreements, 513
 collusive agreements, 514–15
 compliance programmes and training,
 518
 description, 511–13
 economic view, 513–14
 effect of recession, 517–18
 empirical research, 528
 historical evidence, 514
 leniency programme, 515
 normative perceptions, 516–17
 private enforcement, 526–27
 public enforcement
 applications, 520–21
 bankruptcy discounts, 521
 criminal prosecutions, 525–26
 graphite electrodes and industrial bags,
 521–22
 OFT's decision, bid-rigging, 522–25
 Economic theory on market power
 Hypercompetition, 645–46
 neo-Austrian School, 644–45

EU courts case law
 Art. 101 of TFEU, 471
 competition cases–consequences
 nature and scope of judicial review,
 498–501
 single standard of proof and review,
 501–07
 concept of standard of proof
 applicable tests, 476–78
 civil and common law approaches,
 473–76
 core procedural safeguards, 508
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003,
 472
 presumption of innocence
 case of corporate defendants, 495–98
 EU antitrust system, 493–95
 fundamental right, 478–82
 procedural corollaries, 482–84
 standard of proof, 484–88
 types of evidence and standard of
 proof, 488–92
 principle of Member States, 472
 reasoning process, 508–09
 standard of proof in cartel proceeding,
 473
 European Court of Human Rights
 (EctHR)
 AGCM, 576–77
 Art. 6 ECHR, 576, 577
 Court of Justice, 574
 Menarini case, 573

F

Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 143,
 152–53

H

Hatch–Waxman Act, 628–29
 Hearing Officer role in competition
 proceedings, European Commission
 advice to Competition Commissioner,
 456

- applications, interested third persons, 436–38
- decisional powers
 - access to the file, 443–45
 - business secrets and confidential information, 445–47
 - decision requesting information, 439–40
 - description, 438
 - procedural status, 441
 - statement of objections, 441–43
- description, 431–32
- draft decision deals, objections, 455
- general mission, 433–35
- general reporting powers, 453–55
- oral hearing, 436
- recommendation powers
 - legal professional privilege, 448–50
 - privilege against self-incrimination, 450–51
- reporting powers
 - antitrust and merger proceedings, 452–53
 - commitment and settlement procedures, 452
- status, 433
- Hong Kong Competition Bill
 - ambiguity in objective, 187
 - arbitrariness in enforcement, 188
 - ATV-TVB joint acquisition of sports rights, 174
 - bundling of pay TV and broadband Internet access, 172
 - commitment, 188–89
 - COMPAG, 165–66
 - competition landscape, 169–71
 - competition laws, 167–69
 - competition rules, 175–77
 - concurrent jurisdiction, 186–87
 - CPRC, 166
 - description, 165
 - exclusions, 183–84

- exemptions, 185–86
- HKCTV, 172
- IDD fixed fee plans, 173
- institutional framework and enforcement
 - judicial enforcement model, 177–79
 - lack of transparency, 181–82
 - two-tier commitment mechanism, 179–81
- non-application, 182–83
- preamble phrased in the negative, 175
- provisions rested on unstable pillars, 187–88
- sector-specific competition policy, 171–172
- tying of telecommunications services to management fees, 173–74

I

- Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority (OPTA), 661–64, 669
- Indirect regulatory costs, 143
- Intellectual property rights and compulsory licensing
 - the Case of India Inc.
 - compulsory license, patent challenge, 629–30
 - DPCO and NPPA, 626–27
 - exports of TRIPS legal generics, 628
 - Hatch–Waxman Act, patent challenge, 628–29
 - India's generics sector, 627
 - insurance coverage, global
 - developments and growth, 626
 - 2010 revenue, Pharmaceutical Companies, 627
 - corporate and political responsibility, interaction, 631–33
 - India's Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks, 621–22
 - innovation and welfare trade-offs, pharmaceuticals, 622–26
 - TRIPS agreement, 633–34
 - US Hatch–Waxman Act, 634

International Competition Network (ICN),
103

International Direct Dialling (IDD) fixed
fee plans, 173

Internet, jurisdiction and EU competition
law

- anticompetitive practices
 - complete absence of territorial, 348–50
 - downloading and jurisdictional,
346–47
 - EU Commission, 351
 - issue, 346
 - multiple jurisdiction, 352
 - ‘nationality principle’, 351
 - ‘objective territoriality principle’, 351
 - partial absence of territory, 350–51
 - problematic task, 346
 - technical analysis, 346
- ‘effects doctrine’ and ‘implementation
criterion’, 337–40
- electronic transactions affects, 326
- extraterritoriality
 - Gencor*, 334–36
 - Wood Pulp*, 333–34
- global nature, 325–26
- ‘implementation’ criterion, 336–37
- ‘over-territoriality’
 - considerable gap, 341
 - existing jurisdictional, 341
 - extraterritoriality, 341
 - jurisdictional analysis, 341
 - technological and territorial
considerations, 342–44
 - territorially-centric considerations, 341
 - traditional jurisdictional analysis,
341–42
 - v.* extraterritoriality, 344–46
- public international law and
 - anticompetitive practices
 - affected party’s nationality, 332
 - country’s national security, 330
 - country’s sovereignty, 329
 - economic effects, 330

- ‘effects doctrine’, 330
- extreme exercise of extraterritoriality,
331
- individual, 331
- jurisdictional principles, 332
- ‘nationality principle’,
329–30
- part of the offence, 329
- ‘passive personality principle’, 331
- ‘universal principle’, 330–31
- US companies, 332
- substantive and procedural aspects, 353
- technical characteristics and method,
327–29
- territorially-centric approach, 326

J

Jurisdiction, Indian Patent and Competition
Act

- conflict of
 - Aamir Khan Productions Private Limited
and Aamir Hussain Khan v. Union of
India and the Director General
competition Commission of India*,
697–698
- anti-competitive agreements, 695
- Bombay High Court, 698
- Competition Commission, 698–699
- competition law and the law, 694
- Controller of Patents, 696–697
- non-obstante clause, 697
- patented invention, 695, 696
- regimes, 694
- Court/Tribunal, 693
- Legal standards, 702
- patent rights in an anti-competitive way,
694
- section 60, 699
- section 62, 700
- section 21 and 21A, 700–701

K

KME and Chalkor cases, 578–80

L

Laissez-faire approaches, 121, 135

Lawfulness and acceptability of

enforcement of European cartel law
administrative enforcement system,
593–94

Art. 6 ECHR and Art. 47 of the Charter,
597–98

Art. 101 TFEU, 598

case law of the EU Courts,
584–85

Commission, 585–86

Commission's prosecutorial and
sanctioning powers, 594

competition law under administrative law

Commission's margin, 581–82

Court of Justice, 580–81

European courts, 582

General Court, 581

KME and Chalkor cases, 578–80

Menarini case, 575–78

Tetra Laval case, 582

'concerted practices', 584

Decision, 595

Dutch competition authority, 596

economic and enforcement policy,
582–84

EctHR and the Court of Justice,
573–74

efficiency of the administrative
procedure, 595

fining guidelines, 591–93

General Court and Court of Justice,
596–97

Hearing Officer, 594–95

inculpatory and exculpatory evidence,
598

internal market, 594

KME and Chalkor, 574–75

Menarini case, 573–74

Polypropylene cases, 584

reassessment process, 575

risk of formalization, 586–91

Leniency

competition authorities, 675–76

full immunity

conditions required to be fulfilled,
677–78

eligibility criteria, 676–77

evidential threshold, 677

partial leniency/reduction of fines

conditions required to be fulfilled, 680

eligibility criteria, 678

evidential threshold, 679

undertakings/individuals, 675

Leniency programme of the Competition
Commission of Pakistan (CCP)

cartels, 671

Competition Authorities, 675–76

effectiveness, 671–72, 683–84

full immunity, 676–78

genesis, 672–73

heavy penalties, 689–90

investigation procedures, flexible

conditions and additional incentives,
690–91

legal basis for the power to grant
leniency, 674–75

Leniency Notice 1996, 685–86

Leniency Notice 2006, 684–85

marker system, 690

partial leniency/reduction of fines,
678–80

procedure

application, 680–81

confidentiality, 683

decision to grant leniency,
682–83

revocation, 683

Show Cause Notice, 686

specific objectives, 673–74

transparency and predictability, procedure
Article 101 TFEU, 688

Leniency Notice 2006, 687–88

OECD report on 'Fighting Hard-core
Cartels', 686

Regulation 4(2)(b),
686–87
Regulation 3(1) of Regulations 2007,
686
Regulation 4(3) of Regulations 2007,
688–89
Regulation 4(4) of Regulations 2007,
687
Regulation 5(5) of Regulations 2007,
688
undertakings/individuals, 675
Long-run average incremental costs
(LRAIC), 210, 226–27

M

Margin squeeze in the telecommunications
sector
Article 102 TFEU, 231
Deutsche Telekom case, 231
economics-based approach
aggregation test, 227–28
Article 102 TFEU, 208–09
cost test, 224–26
EAGCP report, 208–09
and effects-based approach analyses,
207–08
European competition law, 207
general factors, 209–10
imputation test, 223–24
profitability test, 226–27
regulatory environment, 228–30
specific factors, 210–11
European agencies' approach, 230
European Commission, 206
European Union
British Sugar (BS), 211
Court's rejection of the claim, 212
Deutsche Telekom case, 213–14
direct analogy, 212
incumbents' upstream inputs, 212
Industrie des Poudres Sphériques case,
211–12
National Coal Board (NCB), 211

Péchiney Électrométallurgie (PEM),
212
Telefónica case, 216–17
TeliaSonera case, 214–16
Europe's Court of Justice, 207
United Kingdom
authorities, 220
BSkyB case, 217–18
BT/UK-SPN case, 218–19
Competition Commission (COMCO),
220
competition law, 220
France Télécom (FT), price of calls,
219–20
Genzyme and *Albion Water* cases, 217
jurisdictions, 219
OFCOM application, 219
OFTEL analysis, 218
two-tier approach, 218
United States
antitrust authorities, 222
linkLine case, 221–22
precedents outline, 221
Supreme Court, 221
vertically integrated company, 205
Menarini case, 575–78
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices
Act (MRTP Act)
definition, 239
language of section 3(3), 244
Mahlanobis Committee, 238
section 33, 240

N

National Carbonizing Company (NCC),
211
National Coal Board (NCB), 211
National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority
(NPPA), 626
Netherlands Authority for Consumers and
Markets (ACM)
administrative body, 669
CA, 662

- consumer protection, 662–63
- Dutch government, 661–62
- EU Member States, 660–61
- OPTA and NMa, 661
- public authorities, 663
- strengths, 666–67
- structure
 - Competition Council, 665
 - explanatory memorandum, 663–64
 - inter alia*, competences, 665
 - NMa, OPTA and CA, 664
 - pillars including six directorates, 664–65
 - violation of competition law rules, 665
- super-authority, 659–60, 669–70
- weaknesses, 667–69

O

- Objective justification
 - and Article 102 TFEU, 60–62
 - description, 75–76
 - efficiency, 67–68
 - European Law, 59
 - requirements
 - effect, 74–75
 - intent, 69–71
 - necessity test, 73–74
 - proportionality, 71–73
 - terminology, 61–62
 - types
 - description, 62–63
 - legitimate business behaviour, 63–65
 - public interest considerations, 65–67
- Office of Communications (OFCOM), 219, 226
- Oral hearing in competition proceedings
 - addressees of the statement of objections
 - Article 14(4) and (5) of Regulation 773/2004, 410–11
 - Article 13 of Decision 2011/695, 409–10
 - complainants, 404
 - limitations, 409

- settlement procedures, 404
- third persons, 401–02
- administrative proceedings, 400–01
- Article 12(4) of Decision 2011/695, 425
- commission, 411–12
- commission services, 412
- competition authorities, 413
- complainants, 414–15
- description, 397–98
- general observations, 428–30
- interested third persons, 415–17
- interim report and observations, 425–26
- investigative hearing, 402
- languages, 423–24
- legal basis, 398–99
- merger proceedings
 - and antitrust proceedings, differences, 402–03
 - fines/periodic penalty payments, 406–07
 - role of the Hearing Officer, 418
 - status of interested third person, 418–19
 - written submissions, 407
- new documents, 425
- obligation to provide accurate information, 424
- oral hearings are not public, 408
- presentations, 420–21
- primarily written proceedings, 401
- purpose of the oral hearing, 400
- questions, 421–23
- recording, 424
- request, written submissions, 405–06
- state of play meeting, 426–27
- supplementary statement of objections, 405
- timing, 423
- use of information obtained, 424–25

P

- Patenting strategies of the EU
 - pharmaceutical industry

- Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 EC, 28
- Article 102 TFEU, *AstraZeneca*
- Article 52 of the EPC 2000, 46
 - compulsory licenses, 39–40
 - description, 47–48
 - dominance, 39
 - footprint test, 40
 - litigation, 42–43
 - market definition, 38
 - Paclitaxel/Taxol, 42
 - paroxetine, 43–44
 - Technology Transfer Guidelines, 37–38
 - ‘tool box’, 38
 - validity of formulation patents, 44–45
 - Viagra, 41
 - Windsurfing* case, 47
- Bayer-Adalat* decision, 30
- competition between originator manufacturers, 36–37
- description, 27, 53–54
- ‘evergreening’, 31–32
- features, 28
- innovator product *versus* generic
- benefits of new drug, 34
 - clusters and thickets, 32–33
 - economic role, 32
 - reformulations, 34
 - regulatory concerns, 33
 - ‘reverse payments’, 35
 - settlement payments, 35–36
- Lederle-Praxis Biologicals* decision, 29–30
- legal issues, ‘evergreening’
- criterion of inventiveness needs, 49–50
 - emotional responses, 51–52
 - involvement of third parties, 50–51
 - medicines, 52–53
 - patent legislation, 48–49
- originator products and generics, 29
- Péchiney Électrometallurgie (PEM), 212
- Philip Morris* case, 614–15
- PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) survey, 145
- Public interest theory, 137
- R**
- Recidivism in EU antitrust enforcement
- concept, 8–10
 - contemporaneous infringements, 15–16
 - description, 5–8
 - expressing increased moral condemnation, 14
 - higher propensity to commit infringements, 13–14
 - increasing fines, 18–19
 - and leniency, 19–23
 - limitation period, 16–18
 - lower probability of detection, 14
 - observed incidence, 23–26
 - profitability of infringements, 15
 - reasons for imposing higher fines, 12–13
 - role of fines, 10–12
- Regulation of cartels in India
- Competition Act of 2002, 234
 - competition policy and law, 233
 - economic policy, 233–34
 - FICCI–Multiplex Association of India v. United Producers/Distributors Forum* case, 246
 - Indian Evidence Act differentiation, 243
 - language of section 3(3), 244
 - Mahlanobis Committee, 238
 - major jurisdictions, 234–38
 - MRTTP Act, 239–41
 - M/s Best Xerox Centre v. Xerox Modi India Ltd.* case, 245
 - Parliament, 234
 - Raghavan Committee, 242–43
 - section 19(3), 247
 - section 46 of the Act, power to the Commission, 244–45
 - section 27 of the Competition Act, 243
 - Shri v. Ramachandra Reddy v. HDFC Bank* case, 246
 - State intervention, 238–39
- Rethinking sanctions for breaching EU
- competition law
 - criminalization

- desirability, 86–88
 - feasibility, 83–86
 - Sherman Act 1890, 82
 - criminal penalties, 100
 - description, 77–78
 - director disqualification,
 - UK system
 - advantages and drawbacks, 93–96
 - CDDA, 89, 90
 - CDOs, 90–92
 - CDUs, 92–93
 - centralized model, 97–98
 - decentralized model,
 - 98–99, 101
 - description, 89, 101–02
 - relationship to other sanctions, 99
 - individualized sanctions,
 - 78–82
- S**
- Social costs, 127, 143
 - State aid rules
 - approaches, 457–58
 - compliance problem
 - Article 260 TFEU, 462
 - irregularities, 460
 - misapplication, factors, 461
 - non-notified cases, 459–60
 - non-notified measures, 460
 - severity of sanctions, 462
 - training and transmission of
 - knowledge, 461–62
 - control and enforcement system,
 - weaknesses, 458–59
 - description, 468–69
 - design and application, 463–64
 - institutional capacity and cooperation,
 - 465–68
 - observations, 458
 - Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP)
 - paradigm
 - Chicago School, 643
 - Harvard School, 642
- T**
- TEU competition law aspects of minority
 - shareholdings
 - Art. 101 of TFEU
 - BT/MCI* case, 616–17
 - Olivetti/Digital* case, 615–16
 - Philip Morris* case, 614–15
 - Art. 102 of TFEU, 617–18
 - Commission, 618
 - Commission Green Paper, 618–19
 - ‘competitively significant influence’, 619
 - coordinated effects, 601, 602
 - enforcement gap, 600–01
 - under EUMR
 - Aker Maritime*, 607
 - Microsoft and Time Warner of Content Guard*, 608
 - post-prohibition, 608–11
 - remedies to competition concerns
 - raised, 612–14
 - in third party competitor, 605–07
 - General Court, 618
 - merger control regimes and acquisitions
 - broader concepts of control, 604–05
 - decisive influence test, 603–04
 - reasons, 603
 - Merger Regulation, 599–600
 - minority share acquisition, 601
 - OECD, 601
 - OFT investigation, 600
 - Ryanair/Aer Lingus* merger case, 600
 - unilateral effects, 601, 602
 - The Netherlands Competition Authority
 - (NMa), 661–66
 - The Netherlands Consumer Authority
 - (CA), 662–64
 - T-Mobile* case, 586, 587, 588
 - Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), 328
- V**
- Violations of antitrust provisions
 - abuse of dominance, 113–16
 - cartel infringement, 108–09

description, 118–19
ECA principles for setting fines,
105–08
European Commission Guidelines, 104
implications for percentage range for
cartel fines, 109–12
International Competition Network
(ICN), 103

issues, 103
Kyoto Annual Conference, 104
leniency, 113
role of private enforcement,
116–18

W

World Wide Web (WWW), 328