

# Subject Index

## A

### Anti-competitive effects, Article 102 TFEU

analytical approach, 233

application

Court of Justice, 226–27

legal and economic analysis, 228

object approach, 227

approach taken in case law

Court of Justice, 243

effects-based approach, 244

Commission and judiciary, 224

decisional practice

*INTEL* decision, 235–36

OEMs, 236–37

WMP, 235

economic evaluation, 225

exclusionary conduct, 223

guidance paper, 234–35

*Guidance Paper*, 225

judicial practice

AKZO's intention, 241

anti-competitive effects, 239

Danish Supreme Court, 242–43

*Deutsche Telekom* 239

*Guidance Paper*, 238

*Post Danmark v. Konkurrencerådet*, 241

Post Denmark, 242

*TeliaSonera case*, 240

orthodox approach

case of British Airways, 231

criticism, 231

description, 226

exclusionary supply, 229–30

fidelity rebates, 229

GSK, 229

objective justification, 232–33

pre-emptory force, 228

pricing below average variable costs,  
230

*Tomra case*, 245

### Anti-competitive object and effect

automatic and watertight condemnation,  
554

category-building concept, 555

competition authority, 555

developments and submits proposals, 542

EU competition law, 541

evaluation of *Allianz*, 562–63

horizontal Cooperation Agreements,  
554–55

insurance companies, 564

legal counsel, competition authority

officers and judges, 542

state of EU law after *Allianz*

broker's financial independence, 561

Budapest Court, 557

case-by-case analysis, 562

CJEU, 556

competition authority, 561

current commercial data, 558–59

'effect-type' agreements, 559

*Expedia*, 559

- HCA, 557
- Hungarian insurance law, 556
- 'infringements by object', 558
- market structure, 560
- TFEU and legislative, 557
- state of EU law before *Allianz*
  - case-by-case assessment, 544
  - CJEU, 545
  - competition law, 543
  - concept, 546–47
  - 'effect-type' agreements, 548
  - Matra Hachette SA v. Commission*, 545
- US antitrust law
  - automatic condemnation, 549
  - conclusive presumption, 552
  - judicial convenience, 551
  - jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, 548
  - Per se* rules, 552
  - Sherman Act, 550
  - standard approach, 553
- Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), 285, 316
- Autoriteit Consument en Markt (ACM), 266
- B**
- Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA), 170–71
- Building Societies Act 1986, 430
- C**
- Central Bank in Bank Merger Regulation in India
  - banking sector, competition policy
    - EU, 174
    - International Competition Network, 177
    - Member States, 176
    - national competition authorities, 175
  - bank merger control in the US antitrust regime
    - BHCA, 170–71
    - business units and corporate headquarters, 174
    - competition review, 169
    - competitive effects, 169
    - DOJ, 171–72
    - FTC, 168–69
    - HHI, 170
    - Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 169
    - Society Ameritrust merger, 173
- bifurcated approach, 180–81
- CCI, 165–66
- Competition Act, 178
- Competition policy, 166–67
- Indian economy, 179
- mergers and acquisitions, 182–83
- RBI, 166
- US and the EU, 167
- Cloud computing
  - anticompetitive effects, 62
- cartels
  - croupier and players, 70
  - exchange of information, 68
  - prohibition, 68–69
  - refining, 71–72
- competition authorities
  - consequences, 77–78
  - OR, 76–77
  - powers and limits, 73–76
- concepts
  - IaaS, 64
  - IT experts and plain explanations, 62
  - PaaS, 64
  - SaaS, 64
- CPs, 61
- economic solutions
  - aggravating circumstances, 80
  - heavy fines, cartel cooperators, 80
- exchange of prices, 83
- IT solutions, companies worldwide, 81
- legal and regulatory solutions, 79–80
- services, problems
  - data protection, 66
  - data retention, 67

- description, 64–65
  - different layers of cloud providers, 66
  - location of data, 65–66
  - social norms and conventions, 81–82
  - technological solutions, 78
- Cloud providers (CPs), 61
- Collective dominance
  - case law, 366–67
  - concept, case law
    - General Court, 361
    - oligopolistic markets, 360
    - tacit collusion, 361–62
    - TFEU Article 102, 359
  - conduct with coordinated effects
    - MCC, 362–64
    - MFC, 364
    - MSO, 364–65
    - single dominance comparison, 365–66
- ECJ, 356
- economic approach
  - economic perspective, 358–59
  - higher profit, 357
  - incentives for collusion, 358
  - legal perspective, 356–57
- oligopolies and TFEU article 102
  - anticompetitive abuse, 368
  - ‘demand limitation’, 369
- ECJ, 367
- economic approach, 371
- French–West African Ship-owners
  - Committee, 369–70
  - ‘internal’ organization, 370
- rationality and consistency, case law, 356
- tacit collusion, 371
- TFEU, 355
- Competition Act, 178
- Competition and Consumer Act 2010, 133
- Competition and Markets Authority
  - (CMA), 428
- Competition Commission of India (CCI), 165–66
- Competition Law and UK retail banking
  - appraisal, 436–38
  - barriers to entry, 438–40
  - CMA, 428
  - Competition Act 1998, 427–28
  - competition authorities, 429, 447
  - Enterprise Act 2002, 428
  - European Commission, 425
  - financial services industry, 426
  - ‘fractured state’, 427
  - historical background
    - Building Societies Act 1986, 430
    - Financial Services Act 1986, 430
    - Lloyds/Abbey decision, 431
    - official policy, 429
    - PCAs, 431
    - RBS, 430–31
  - ICB, 445
  - inquiries, 433–34
  - labour party, 448
  - market structure and the financial crisis
    - Competition Commission, 443
    - Enterprise Act 2002, 441
    - European Commission, 440
    - HBOS, 440
    - Lloyds, 441
    - mortgage market, 442
    - RBS, 444–45
  - modern era, 432
  - OFT, 446
  - policy of privatization, 426
  - remedies
    - Consumer Credit Directive, 435
    - OFT, 434
    - PCA market, 434
- Counterfactual on information sharing
  - Asnef-Equifax
    - anti-competitive effects, 475–76
    - applicability of Article 101(3) TFEU, 474–75
    - applying the guidelines, 475
    - Article 101(3) TFEU, 476–77
    - effect of restricting competition, 473–74
    - information exchange, 472

object of restricting competition, 473  
 Courts' leading cases, 484

#### *Dole*

court's analysis of the pre-pricing  
 communications, 482–83  
 General Court, 483–84  
 information exchange, 482  
 object of restricting competition,  
 483  
 European Commission's guidelines,  
 459–60  
 information sharing  
 analysis of information exchanged,  
 463–65  
 analysis of market characteristics,  
 463  
 Article 101(3) TFEU, 465  
 Commission's general policy, 460–61  
 competitive parameters, 463  
 pro- and anti-competitive effects of  
 information exchanges, 461  
 restricting competition, 461–62  
 information sharing under the guidelines,  
 488  
 John Deere  
 anti-competitive outcome, 472  
 Article 101(1) TFEU, 471  
 information exchange systems,  
 466–67  
 market characteristics, 469–70  
 market's transparency, 470  
 UK agricultural tractor registration  
 exchange, 467–69  
 law and economics, 486–88  
 restatement of the case law, 485–86  
 sharing agreements, 460  
 T-mobile Netherlands  
 anti-competitive effects, 479  
 applicability of the guidelines, 478  
 Article 101(3) TFEU, 480  
 Court's analysis and the counterfactual  
 analysis, 481  
 information exchange, 477

object of restricting competition,  
 478–79

Court of First Instance (CFI), 492

## **D**

Department of Justice (DOJ), 171–72

## **E**

Enterprise Act 2002, 441

Environmental and competitive  
 performances  
 authorities, 414–15  
 competition law, 415  
 competition policy, 413  
 countries, econometric analysis, 419–24  
 emissions, 417  
 green industries, 410  
 high-performers, 411  
 IEA, 415  
 industrial organizations, 414  
 legal frameworks, 412–13  
 linkages, 410  
 national governments, 410  
 productivity, 418  
 protection, 409  
 quadrant representing low carbon  
 intensity, 411–12  
 variables, econometric model, 415–16  
 Essential Facility Doctrine (EFD), 513  
 European Commission in the light of  
 fundamental rights  
 Competition Commissioner, 566  
 District Court in Brussels, 565–66  
 judgment of the ECJ in OTIS  
 equality of arms, 568–70  
*Nemo Judex In Sua Causa*, 567–68  
 representative, 566–67  
 responsibilities under regulation 1/2003  
 amount of fines, 579–82  
 competition proceedings, 570–72  
 ECtHR's ruling, 572–75  
 judicial restraint, 576–79  
 jurisdiction practise, 575–76

European Competition Network (ECN),  
275

European Court of Human Rights  
(ECtHR)  
court splits Article 6, 573  
judicial review, 574–75  
*Menarini*, 572  
procedural rights, 573

## F

Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 91, 92,  
168–69, 196  
Financial Services Act 1986, 430

## G

Gaz de France (GDF)  
alleged exclusionary strategy, 527  
Commission, 527  
French gas import and supply markets,  
526–27  
LNG terminal, 528  
transportation capacity, 527

## H

Hearing Officer (HO)  
administrative procedure  
criticisms and urgency to reform,  
15–18  
structural reform and strengthening of  
role, 18–19  
commitment and settlement procedures,  
15  
description, 5–6  
institutional position and powers, 6  
institutional status, 15–16  
investigative phase, 14–15  
reform of the status and role  
attendees to hearing, 26–27  
functioning and conduct, 28  
hearing and the final decision, 30  
preparation and organization, 27–28  
publicity, 29–30  
Secretariat General/Legal Service,  
19–22

transforming nature of oral hearing,  
25–26  
transforming the reporting function,  
22–25  
review and reporting function, 12–14  
staff and resources, 30  
traditional powers  
applications heard by third parties, 7–8  
Competition Commissioner, 11–12  
extension of deadlines, 8–9  
file and confidentiality, 9–10  
oral hearings preparation and conduct,  
10–11  
third parties and complainants, 6–7  
third parties participation, oral  
hearings, 8  
Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI),  
170  
Hungarian Competition Act (HCA), 557

## I

Independent Commission on Banking  
(ICB), 445  
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), 64  
International Energy Agency (IEA), 415  
Italian Competition Authority (ICA)  
Council of State, 522  
EFD, 521  
ENI and TTPC'S  
Council of State, 523  
EFD principles, 523–24  
Legislative Decree No. 164/2000,  
525  
ship-or-pay clauses, 524–25  
supply markets, 525  
Eni/TTPC, 521  
GDF, 526–28  
Legislative Decree No. 164/2000, 523

## L

Leniency programmes and damages actions  
in antitrust law  
civil-law claims, 276  
'common legal principles', 271

- contribution of the court of justice and the general court
- anticompetitive practices, 280–81
- Courage and Crehan* precedent, 281
- Court of Justice, 278
- domestic courts, 279
- Member States, 279–80
- Pfleiderer* judgment, 282
- principle of transparency, 278
- Courage and Manfredi*, 274
- ECN, 275
- enforcement, EU antitrust law, 275
- EU antitrust law, 271–72
- EU courts on national courts, 282–83
- European competition network, 273
- European Convention on Human Rights, 277
- institutions and the Member States, 273–74
- Italian Federation, 272
- legal perspective, 272–73
- leniency notice and the white paper, 276
- optimal balance, 277–78
- Pfleiderer* case, 274–75
- ‘pre-existing documents’, 277
- private enforcement of Article 101 TFEU, 269
- self-incriminating statements, 276
- working document, 270–71

## M

### Market definition

- air cargo, 374
- competition authorities, 385
- Court’s reasoning, 385
- customers in New Zealand, 378–79
- ‘hot tub process’, 386
- hypothetical monopolist test, 379
- New Zealand Commerce Commission, 373–74
- SSNIP, 380
- suppliers and customers, 381
- supply-side substitution

- airline experts, 382–83
- belly-hold capacity, 383–84
- demand-side substitution, 384–85
- DO services, 384
- economic principles, 381
- European Commission, 381
- OD and DO, 383
- USA, 382
- transport services
  - customer, 375
  - geographic dimension of air-cargo markets, 377
  - principled approach, 375
  - product dimension air-cargo markets, 376
  - SSNIP, 377–78
- Market integration and economic efficiency
  - anti-competitive assessment, 128
  - Article 35 TFEU, 129
  - cheap hydroelectricity, 103
  - comparison of 4 scenarios
    - Danish customers, 125
    - producers in North Sweden, 125–26
    - SvK’s objectives, 127
    - Swedish network operator, 126
    - Swedish regulator, 127
    - TSO, 126
  - competition law case, 100
  - congestion shifting
    - capacity reduction, cross-border, 115
    - Denmark and Sweden, 118–19
    - network operator, 117
    - Nordic power market, 110
    - producer surplus and consumer surplus, 114–15, 117–18
    - regional prices, import and export quantities, 111–12
    - surplus, 112–15
    - total transmission capacity, 116
  - consumer surplus and production costs, 106
  - counter-trading, 108
  - day-ahead market, 108

- economic analysis, 132–33
- first-best outcome, 105–06
- four scenarios, 109
- Justice's case law, 129
- legal and policy audience, 102
- market splitting
  - congestion shifting and counter-trading, 122
  - producer surplus and consumer surplus, 123
  - strategic congestion, 124
  - Swedish electricity market, 122
- negative effect, 130
- network operator, 107
- numerical illustration, 103–04
- order conditions of optimization
  - problem, 104
- partial congestion shifting
  - consumer surplus in Denmark, 121
  - counter-trading losses, 122
  - day-ahead price, 119
  - surplus of consumers, 120–21
  - Swedish network operator, 119
- simplified market model, 102–03
- SvK's behaviour, 101
- Swedish electricity network, 99–100
- transmission capacity, 105
- TSO, 107
- Market power in online search and social networking
  - advertisement-based media, 199
  - competition analysis, 199–200
  - contestability of the markets
    - barriers to entry, 218–19
    - consumer lock-in, 219–20
  - economics of two-sided markets, 198
  - Facebook and Google, 197–98
  - fast-evolving markets, 195–96
  - framework for assessment
    - advertisers, 209
    - approaches adopted by competition authorities, 214–15
    - 'brick and mortar' solutions, 208
    - competition authorities, 218
    - competitive constraint, 213
    - economic tools for market definition, 215–16
    - European Commission, 207
    - Google/DoubleClick, 217
    - Internet's audience, 211
    - LiveUniverse v. Myspace*, 209
    - market definition, 205
    - non-search advertising, 213
    - online and offline advertising, 210
    - relevant market of the platform, 214
    - search and non-search advertising, 212
    - search engine advertising, 211–12
    - search engine industry, 207
    - social networking websites, 206
    - web portals, 208
- FTC, 196
- Google's business, 196
- heterosexual dating club, 198
- indirect network effects, 204–05
- network externalities, 202
- non-search advertising, 203
- offline market, 220–21
- price structure, 200
- search-based advertising, 202–03
- sell advertising space, 201
- two-sided markets, 197
- websites, 201
- wheat market, 199
- Meet-Competition Clause (MCC), 362–64
- Merger Control in China
  - AML, 285
  - enforcement
    - Article 9 of Notification Documents, 301
    - behavioural remedies, 301–02
    - Coca-Cola/Huiyuan* decision, 298
    - Competition Assessment*, 297–98
    - conditional clearances, MOFCOM, 309–10
    - decisions, 294–96
    - GM/Delphi*, 299, 303–04

- Google/Motorola*, 299
  - Hitachi/Western Digital*, 306
  - InBev/Anheuser-Busch*, 302
  - Market Definition Guidance*, 297
  - Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite*, 303, 307
  - MOFCOM, 300
  - Novartis/Alcon*, 299, 305
  - Panasonic/Sanyo*, 305
  - Provisional Divestiture Measures*, 308
  - Uralkali/Silvinit*, 299, 305–06, 309
  - guidance materials and legislation, 310–11
  - ‘industrial policies’, 312–13
  - MOFCOM, 286–87
  - prospective merging parties, 311
  - regime framework
    - EU and US systems, 287
    - EU-China Competition Policy Dialogue*, 293–94
    - incremental transactions, 290
    - MOFCOM, 288
    - Notification Guidance*, 292
    - Notification Measures*, 291
    - rights of the defence and appeals, 294
    - rules and guidance, 288–89
  - State Council, 312
  - Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), 286–87
  - Minority Shareholdings (MSO), 364–65
  - Most-Favoured-Customer Clause (MFC), 364
- N**
- National Competition Authority (NCA), 490
  - National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 316
- O**
- Obstruction of Investigation in EU Competition Law
    - Article 23(1) of Regulation 1/2003, 247–48
  - Commission’s margin of discretion, 259–60
  - Energie and Suez Environnement*, 248
  - fining, 260
  - fining procedural infringements in practice
    - ACM, 266
    - Commission, 261
    - current fining guidelines, 264–65
    - e-mail accounts, 263
    - OFT, 265
    - Suez Environnement*, 262
    - transparency and degree of predictability, 264
    - treatment and legal certainty, 263
  - obsolete circumstance, 251–52
  - obstructive behaviour, 249–50
  - principles of Union law, 260
  - provisions of the fining guidelines, 248–49
  - standalone decision
    - E.ON Energie case*, 255–57
    - EPH, 258–59
    - legal basis, 252–55
    - Suez Environnement Case*, 257–58
  - Office of Fair Trading (OFT), 265
  - Orion routing (OR), 76–77
  - Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), 236–37
- P**
- Paradox of Australian Competition Policy
    - authorization process and study
      - Australian competition law, 134
      - Commission, 136
      - Consumer Commission, 135
      - microeconomic reform program, 138
      - Qantas Air New Zealand*, 136–37
      - Trade Practices Act 1974*, 137
    - Competition and Consumer Act 2010, 133



- contextualizing public benefits
  - competitive nation in globalized world, 154–57
  - consumer rights in post-industrial market economy, 150–52
  - description, 149–50
  - rationalizing industry and market reform, 152–54
  - uncertain times, 157–161
- decisions by the Commission, 163
- economists and lawyers, 161
- government agenda, 162–63
- types of public benefits
  - authorization process, 148–49
  - Clay and Brick Paver Association of Victoria, 146
  - competition and fostering business efficiency, 145
  - competition law, 144
  - cost savings, 144
  - economic efficiency, 140–44
  - market failure, 146
  - meaning, 139–40
  - quality and safety, 147
  - self-regulation scheme, 148
- ‘Pay-for-delay’ settlements
  - Directorate-General for Competition, 86–87
  - European Commission, 86
  - patent settlements, 85
  - pharmaceutical companies, 85
  - reverse payments, 96–97
  - settlement assessment
    - acceptable consideration, 94–96
    - Courts and commentators, 93–94
    - reverse payments, 92–93
  - situation in the US
    - FTC, 91–92
    - scope of patent test, 88–89
    - stricter approaches, 89–90
- Personal Current Accounts (PCAs), 431
- Platform as a Service (PaaS), 64
- Presumptions, market dominance and oligopoly in Europe and China
  - abuse of a position, 330–32
  - AKZO presumption, 328
  - American Bar Association, 336
  - AML, 316
  - in Article 19 AML, 332–34
  - Article 102 TFEU, 318–19
  - Chinese antimonopoly law, 328–30
  - Chinese competition authority, 339
  - Chinese legal test, 334
  - collective dominance, 318, 325–27
  - collective entity on collusive conduct
    - Article 102 TFEU, 324–25
    - collusion and economic interdependence, 323
    - economically interdependent, 323
  - collective entity under Article 102 TFEU
    - Cewal, 321
    - ECJ, 320–21
    - non-collusive markets, 322
  - EC competition law, 338
  - enforcement, 338–39
  - fair market competition, 337
  - legislative process, 317
  - market dominance and abuse in Article 102 TFEU
    - collective dominance, 320
    - United Brands v. Commission*, 319
  - market shares, 334–35
  - NDRC, 316
  - SAIC and NDRC, 337–38
  - seller concentration, 315–16
  - sportswear market, 335
- Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law
  - anticompetitive conduct, parameters of enforcement systems, 611–13
  - competition authority, 610
  - competition law enforcement
    - abuses of a dominant position, 606
    - European competition law and policy, 606–08

- horizontal agreements, 604–05
- public and private, 603
- type of infringement, 604
- vertical agreements, 605–06
- enforcement of private rights, 586
- ‘fine tuning’, 610
- Green Paper in 2005, 585
- interaction of public and private
  - enforcement
    - damage payment, 594
    - financial gain, 596
    - private enforcement, 593–94
    - public enforcer, 595
    - ‘pure’ private system, 594
  - optimal enforcement mix
    - antitrust errors, 598
    - capacity and quality of enforcement institutions, 599
    - conduct and enforcement costs, 598
    - information possession and gathering, 599–600
    - legal certainty, 600–01
    - sanctions and remedies, 602–03
    - scepticism, 596–97
  - pure enforcement types
    - antitrust authorities, 588
    - cleverest detection rule, 588
    - demand elasticity, 589
    - European Commission, 591–92
    - illegal activity, 589
    - infringement, 590
    - private enforcement, 591–93
    - public enforcement, 587
  - vertical agreements, 609
  - White Paper in 2008, 585
- R**
- Reserve Bank of India (RBI), 166
- Restraints on selective distribution
  - agreements
    - allocative efficiency, 510–11
    - block exemption regime, 492–93
    - CFI, 492
    - comparative note, 508–09
    - consumer welfare
      - antitrust law, 505
      - Article 102, 506
      - authority’s competition, 505
      - competition authorities, 504
      - Merci Convenzionali, 506
      - restrict competition, 507
    - EU competition law, 489
    - industrial policy, 509–10
    - Metro 1* formula, 491
    - NCA, 490
    - pierre fabre*
      - ECJ, 501–02
      - French NCA, 498–500
      - GlaxoSmithKline, 503
      - NCA, 504
    - Regulation 2790/99, 490
    - re-regulation
      - antitrust intervention, 496–97
      - distribution market, 496
      - incomplete theories of harm, 494–95
    - selective distribution, 510
    - selective distribution agreements, 492
    - selective distribution and the internet, 497–98
  - Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), 430–31
  - S**
  - Services of general economic interest (SGEI), 388
  - Software as a Service (SaaS), 64
  - State aid control
    - Article 106(2) TFEU, 395–97
    - Article 107(3) TFEU *vs.* Article 106(2) TFEU, 401–04
    - Commission’s backlog, 388
    - decentralization *vs.* centralization
      - centralized notification system, 391
      - EU antitrust law, 390–91
      - national competition authorities, 389–90
      - regulatory capture, 390

- TFEU, 391
  - direct effect, 398–401
  - discretion, 397–98
  - economic interest
    - Altmark* case, 392
    - ECJ, 392
    - Member States, 394–95
    - public service compensation, 393
  - enforcement, 407–08
  - EU antitrust law, 387
  - and national competition authorities
    - delegation, 404–06
    - permissibility of delegation, 406–07
  - national courts, 398–98
  - SGEI, 388, 389
  - Strategic underinvestment
    - antitrust intervention, 537
    - application of the EFD in GDF Suez and Eni
      - duty to supply *vs.* duty to invest, 534–36
      - elimination of effective competition, 533–34
      - gas import infrastructures, 531–32
      - logical and legal prerequisite, 532
    - capacity degradation, 529
    - capacity hoarding, 529
    - case-by-case approach, 515
    - dominance rules, 537
    - ECJ, 514
    - EFD, 513
    - effective competition, 531
    - ENI case before the commission, 529–31
    - Eni-TTPC* case, 530–31
    - ICA, 514–15
    - lack of capacity
      - antitrust obligation, 518–19
      - Commission and national competition authorities, 515–16
      - competition authorities, 516
      - Frankfurt Airport, 518
      - Port of Rodby*, 517
      - Stena Sealink, 517–18
      - tools for developing antitrust law, 538–39
      - TTPC, 519–21
- T**
- Trade Practices Act* 1974, 137
  - Transmission System Operator (TSO), 107
  - Trans Tunisian Pipeline Company Limited (TTPC)
  - ICA, 520
  - market scenario, 519
  - TAR, 520–21
  - Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 355
  - Two-sided markets
    - additional time, 59
    - competition authorities, 44
    - competition policy, 35, 36
    - competitive environments firms, 42
    - customer, 38–39
    - deductive approach, 47–49
    - description, 33–34
    - economics literature, 37
    - indirect network effects, 44
    - interview approach, 49–50
    - media markets and payment cards
      - markets, 34
    - merchant mode, 42
    - negative indirect network effects, 38
    - newspaper, 38
    - non-transaction market, 45
    - payment cards market, 40
    - qualitative approach, 46–47
    - quantitative approach, 50–52
    - revealed preferences approach, 54–58
    - stated preferences approach, 52–54
    - suspect' behaviour, 43–44
    - transaction costs, 41
    - two-sided platform mode, 42–43
    - video game developers, 37