

# Subject Index

## A

American Home Products (AHP), 187, 188  
Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), 62, 142, 143,  
270, 369, 371, 372, 379, 381, 382,  
384, 389 Antitrust damages actions  
Commission's decision, 290  
competition authority, 272  
competition law, 271, 275, 280–83, 290  
Damages Directive, 273  
document disclosure, 273–84  
European institutions, 272  
information exchanges, 283–84  
national procedural rules, 272  
Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del  
Mercato (AGCM), 10

## B

Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs), 91–92

## C

China Light & Power (CLP)  
current submarine cable connecting,  
591  
economic sense, 474, 582  
geographic market, 584  
HEC, 573, 578, 590, 599  
power grid, 583, 588  
SOC agreement, 575, 577, 595  
submarine cable connecting, 593  
transmission networks, 582, 583  
Chinese competition law, 142, 369–89

Collusion, 137, 461, 473, 504, 544, 552, 562  
industry, 236  
information exchange, 237  
LDP, 236–47  
Russian pipe manufacturers, 235  
self-incrimination, 237  
Competition Commission of India (CCI),  
249–59  
Competition Commission of Singapore  
(CCS), 30, 32, 35, 40, 50  
Competition law, 149–72, 369–89, 517–40,  
541–67  
electricity market, 594–95  
environmental laws and policy, 593  
Hong Kong electricity, 594  
market liberalization, 595–99  
Competition Law Investigations  
companies, 98–100  
confidentiality and security of the  
processing, 88–89  
Data Protection Directive, 85–86  
data protection law and competition  
rules, 69  
data protection stage  
controllers, 74–75  
data subjects, 75  
processors, 75  
supervisory authorities, 76  
EU and national level, 70–71  
EU data protection legal framework,  
71–73

- EU institutions and bodies, 86
  - international data transfers
    - BCRs, 91–92
    - Bilateral International Agreements, 93–95
    - consent and important public interest, 92
    - EEA, 90–91
    - establishment, exercise/defence of legal claims, 92–93
  - key data protection principles
    - BYOD, 85
    - compliance, legal obligation, 80
    - consent, 79
    - Data Protection Directive, 76
    - data quality principle, 82
    - DG Competition's Antitrust Manual of Procedures, 77
    - DG Competition's Privacy Statement, 82
    - Dutch competition, 84
    - French Supreme Court, 84
    - lawfulness of processing, 78–79
    - legitimate interest, 80–81
  - Member States' laws, 86–87
  - non-compliance, data protection law, 95–98
  - 'personal data' and 'processing', 73–74
  - Privacy Statement, 86
  - registration, 89–90
  - rights of data subjects, 87–88
  - Competition Ordinance, 541, 542, 549–51, 554, 556, 557, 559, 565–567
    - conduct rules, 543–46
    - enforcement provisions, 547–48
    - exclusions and exemptions, 546–47
  - Copyright Societies under Scrutiny
    - collecting societies, 123
  - EU approach to the Italian solution
    - collective management still, 125
    - competitive copyright management models, 124
  - ICA, 126
  - Italian legislator, 127
  - Liberalization Decree, 127–28
  - provision rationale, 128–30
  - SIAE, 131–32
  - 'teleological virtues', 124
  - Italian reform, 122
  - techniques and media, 121–22
  - traditional paradigm, 122–23
- D**
- Damages Directive, 271, 272, 284, 286, 291, 315
    - black list, 280–82
    - category, 277–78
    - competition authority, 279–80
    - effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties, 283
    - general right to disclosure of documents, 278–79
    - grey list, 282
    - white list, 282–83
  - Document disclosure, EU law
    - Damages Directive, 277–83
    - English law, 284–86
    - French blocking statute, 287–89
    - National Grid case, 286–87
    - probative evidence, 273
    - transparency regulation
      - Commission documents, 275, 276
      - private litigants, 274
- E**
- EU Antitrust enforcement system
    - administrative proceedings, 24
    - AGCM, 10
    - Article 101 infringements, 23
    - Chalkor* and *Schindler* cases, 19–20
    - Common Market Law, 14
    - Competition and the Legal Service, 22
    - Court of Justice, 17–18
    - ECHR, 6
    - ECSC Treaty, 12–13
    - EFTA, 15

- European Court of Human Rights,
  - 10–11
- ‘full jurisdiction’, 12
- General Court, 7
- Jussila v. Finland*, 8–10
- Legal Service, 21
- Merger Regulation, 13
- Microsoft case, 16
- Regulation 1/2003, 11
- Regulation 773/2004, 21
- review of legality, 12
- TEU, 8
- TFEU, 6
- EU competition fines
  - competition infringements, 436
  - (dis)proportionate nature, 435
  - proportionality, judicial review
    - Commission, 457–58
    - ‘competition policy’, 455–56
    - General Court, 456–57
  - proportionality *stricto sensu*
    - Article 49(3) of Charter, 454–55
    - conflicting interests, 452
    - fining guidelines, 450
    - inability, pay fine, 452–53
    - judicial abstention, 451
    - ‘scale’/‘matrix’, 449
  - proportionality test
    - description, 439–40
    - ‘fine per infringement’ approach, 441–42
    - fining guidelines, 440–41, 443
    - ‘gains improperly made’, 444
    - ‘improper gains’, 443–44
    - LRA, 445–48
    - price difference, 444
    - suitability, 440–42
  - proportionality *vs.* deterrence
    - competition enforcement, 436–38
    - disproportionate fines, 438–39
- EU General Court Judgment
  - consumers and smaller companies, 432–34
  - dominant undertakings
    - ‘effects-based’, 424
    - efficient-competitor test, 428–32
    - ‘form-based’, 421–22
    - negative effects, 424–25
    - pro-competitive Justifications, 425–27
    - relevant effects, 427–28
    - so-called more economic approach, 422–24
    - sound categorization, 422
  - economics use, Article 102 TFEU
    - Charter of Fundamental Rights, 419
    - economic theories of competition, 412–14
    - integrate economic and legal analysis, 420–21
    - interpretation, 414–16
    - lawyers *vs.* economists, 410–12
    - objective, 417–18
  - intel judgment
    - AMD, 407
    - CPUs, 406
    - microchip manufacturer, 405
    - microelectronic devices, 406
  - so-called more economic approach
    - Intel* judgment, 409–10
    - Priorities Paper, 408–09
  - terminology, 410
- European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 6–11, 14–16, 20, 21, 24, 63, 419, 456, 457
- European Merger Control Regulation (EUMR), 402, 488, 490–502, 503–14
- Exclusionary intent, enforcement of Article 102 TFEU
  - anti-competitive collusion, 461–62
  - below-cost pricing, 475–76
  - cost-standard test, 474–75
  - decisional practice, 462
  - description, 459–60
  - enforcement considerations
    - CJEU, 484–85

- commission guidance paper, 483–84
- sanctions and damages, 482–83
- intent evidence
  - competition law, 470
  - ‘conceptual discordancy’, 464
  - EU and US approaches, 466–67
  - evidentiary issues, 467–68
  - intent-sceptic approach, 465
  - ‘special responsibility’, 463
  - ‘normal competition’, 461
- predatory pricing, 471–74
- recoupment, 477–78
- regulatory process, 481–82
- selective price cuts, 479–80

## F

- Fair, Reasonable and Non-discriminatory (FRAND), 53–68
- Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 34, 60, 64, 150, 151, 175, 181, 182, 187–91, 193, 199

## H

- Hong Kong Competition Law
  - blanket exclusion of statutory bodies, 556–59
  - cap for pecuniary penalty, 565–66
  - Chief Executive in Council, 559–60
  - Competition Ordinance, 543–48
  - de minimis* exclusions, 560–61
  - judicial enforcement model and restrictive private actions, 563–65
  - lack of cross-sector merger control, 549–51
  - legislative history, 542
  - PRC, 542
  - public consultations and Legislative Council, 541
  - second conduct rule, 554–56
  - substantial degree of market power, 551–53
  - warning notices, 562–63

- Hong Kong Electric Company (HEC), 573, 575, 583, 584, 586, 591
  - and CLP, 577, 578, 595, 599
  - electricity market, 582
  - electricity supplier, 574
  - power grids, 588, 590
  - SOC agreements, 595
  - transmission networks, 582
- Hong Kong’s electricity sector
  - competition law, 593–99
  - electricity market, 570
  - environmental effects, 572
  - EU competition law, 571
  - liberalization, 571, 580–93
  - regulatory reform, 569
  - regulatory regime
    - capital investment plan, 578
    - CLP, 573, 574, 575
    - Competition Ordinance, 580
    - consumers, 579
    - Electricity Supply Companies Commission, 574
    - Energy Advisory Committee, 573
    - Legislative Council, 579
    - legislators and local community, 577
    - SOC agreements, 574–76
    - US jurisdictions, 578

## I

- Indian merger control regime
  - CCI, 252, 255
  - DBS, 254–55
  - decisional practice, CCI
    - ‘delayed filings’, 255, 258
    - ‘effects doctrine’, 257
    - international law, 256
  - ‘delayed filing’, 254
  - mitigating factors, 255
  - reportable transactions, 250
  - statutory thresholds, 251
  - tire and wheel manufacturer, 253
  - Titan International, 253

'Innovation Market Analysis' (IMA), 146,  
180, 183, 184, 185, 204–06  
concentration and innovation, 196  
framework/theoretical approach, 196  
innovation competitors, 196–97  
'market structure' and innovation, 198–99  
missing theoretical basis, 200  
R&D efforts, 195  
US antitrust law, 194–95

Innovation markets, future  
markets/potential competition  
'actual potential competition', 178, 183  
anticompetitive effects, 174, 203  
antitrust authorities, 174  
applicability of approaches, 191–92  
*Astra/Zeneca*, 181  
competition authorities, 174, 200  
competitors, 175  
'creative destruction', 173  
distinct approaches, 192  
diverse market participants, 201  
'diversity' and 'parallel research', 204  
efficiencies, 205  
European Commission (EC), 182  
'firm affiliation', 202  
FTC, 175  
'future-'/'innovation markets', 183  
'future markets' approach, 178–79  
IMA, 180–81, 193  
incentives and abilities, 203–04  
merger cases, 181  
Muris's statement, 194  
'observable' R&D projects  
AHP, 187  
*Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz*, 189  
European Commission, 191  
FTC, 187–88  
future product market, 190  
'perceived potential competition', 177  
'potential competition doctrine', 176  
'potential competitor', 177  
R&D projects, 183  
*Roche/Genentech* decision, 182

traditional identification, 203  
'unobservable' R&D projects  
Department of Justice, 184–85  
'innovation market cases', 184  
Northrop Grumman, 185–86  
'perceived potential competition', 187  
Italian Competition Authority (ICA), 10,  
126–28, 130, 131

## J

Justifications and Anti-competitive  
Unilateral Conduct  
advantage, 48  
applicable regulatory framework, 48  
Australia, 31  
Australian and Canadian cases, 36  
below-cost pricing, 50  
*Brunswick* case, 42–43  
Canada, 31–32  
*Canada Pipe* judgment, 41  
CCS, 29–30  
CJEU, 34–35, 45  
comparative analysis, 28  
competitive behaviour, 45–46  
contextual analysis, 41, 42  
description, 30–31  
EU law, 46  
European Union, 32  
International Competition Network, 28  
*laissez-faire* approach, 45  
legal rules, 27  
'legitimate business justification', 41–42  
monopoly prices, 44  
*Olympia Equipment Leasing*, 43  
*Post Danmark* judgment, 37  
predation, 48–49–50  
'pro-competitive business justification',  
35  
*Queensland Wire* judgment, 38  
Sherman Act, 39  
Singapore, 32–33  
'socially beneficial', 40  
South Africa, 33–34

- unilateral conduct laws, 29
- US Federal Courts, 47
- VANS, 48–49

## L

- Large diameter pipes (LDP), 146, 236–37
  - capacity constraints, 242
  - companies' behaviour, 238
  - credible commitments, 243–46
  - economic justification, 239
  - FAS, 239–40
  - foregoing factors, 246
  - governance mechanism, 240
  - horizontal, 240
  - institutional economics, 247
  - manufacturers, 246
  - mechanism, 241–43
  - pipeline construction, 242
  - procurement and supply procedures, 245
  - Russian suppliers, 239
  - tender procedures, 242
  - vertical, 240
- Legislation blocking antitrust investigations
  - Australian claw-back provisions, 108
  - blocking legislation, 104
  - Business Records Protection Act, 106–07
  - foreign enforcement, 105
  - functions and legality, international law, 109–10
  - Russian blocking order and 2011
    - Russia/EU Antitrust memorandum
    - EU marketplace, 113
    - Gazprom practices, 113–14
    - pure blocking legislation, 111–12
  - Russia's economic interests, 103
  - Uranium litigation in US, 107
- Less restrictive alternative ('LRA'), 445–48
- Litigation-based strategy, 571
  - antitrust laws, 588
  - category, 589
  - CLP and HEC, 582–83, 590
  - Competition Ordinance, 580, 581

- deficiencies

- CLP and HEC, 590, 591
  - Competition Commission, 592
  - electricity companies, 591
  - electricity market, 592
  - electricity sector, 593
- Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services*, 585
- economic sense, 474, 582
- electricity sector, 580
- European Court of Justice, 589
- geographic market, 584
- legitimate business justifications, 586
- market power, 581
- plaintiff competitor's, 587
- pre-existing relationship, 585
- submarine cable connecting, 588
- Supreme Court, 586, 587
- transmission network, 586

## M

- Management studies
  - behavioural economics, 519
  - bounded rationality
    - behavioural theories, 525
    - competitive inertia, 525
    - learning and competitive process, 527–28
  - learning processes, 528
  - organizations, 529
  - principal-agent problem, 526–27
  - rational agents, 530
  - rational choice theory, 526
  - variation, retention and selection, 531–32
- business strategists, 538
- competition law, 518, 532–33
- corporate executives, 522
- corporate policy, 521
- decision-making structure, 523
- experimental evidence, framing effects, 518–19
- interventionist competition law, 520

managers and firms, 521  
 managers' attitudes, 522  
 market power, 533  
 merger control, 536–37  
 organizations, 524  
 rationality assumption, 517  
 Market liberalization, 570, 571  
   electricity consumption, 595–97  
   pollution control technology, 597  
   switching to cheaper fuel, 597–99

## N

National Commission on Markets and Competition (NCMC), 270  
 Article 4 of the Organic Statute, 357  
*Audiencia Nacional*, 351  
 cost saving, 354  
 eight agencies, 365  
 enforcement and promotion, 357  
 institutional premises, 352  
 lack of consensus, 365  
 National Competition Commission, 352  
 Nature and Legal Status, 356–57  
 organization and operation  
   Competition Acts of 1963, 362  
   Competition Directorate, 361  
   investigation directorates, 358  
   recognized prestige and professional capacity, 359  
 politicization, 366  
 socio-economic, 353  
 system performance and powers  
   General State Budget, 364  
   *mutatis mutandis*, 363  
 transparency and responsibility, 365  
 Net present value (NPV), 212–13  
 Non-controlling minority shareholdings  
   Article 8, EUMR, 505–06  
   Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, 491–92  
   *BT/MCI* case, 494  
   burdens and costs, 498–500  
   2013 Commission consultation, 501  
   competitive concerns, 495

convergence, 495–96  
 coverage, control and 'safe harbours'  
   concentration control systems, 507–08  
   'material influence', 508  
   SWD, 508–09  
   'undertakings concerned', 507  
 domestic and EU company law, 493  
 economic theory, 494  
 EU and domestic jurisdiction, 514  
 EU merger control system, 487–88  
 EUMR, 488, 507  
*ex-ante* method  
   one-stop-shop mechanism, 511  
   'self-assessment' systems, 512  
   SWD and WP, 509–10  
   '(targeted) transparency system', 512  
   'transparency system', 510  
*ex-post* system, 512–14  
 German merger control system, 496–97  
 2014 impact assessment, 500  
 jurisdictions, 495  
 laissez-faire approach, 503–04  
*Laval/Sidel*, 493  
 merger control, 490, 498  
 minority shareholdings, EU, 501  
*Ryanair/Aer Lingus*, 493  
 status quo, 488  
 substantive test, 514  
 2013 SWD, 501–02  
 Takeover Bids Directive, 494  
 TFEU, 488  
 treaty articles' enforcement priorities, 504  
 UK concentration control system, 497–98  
 2014 white paper, 502–03  
 Zephyr Database, 500

## P

People's Republic of China (PRC), 542  
 Price Concentration Analysis (PCA), 270  
   abuse of dominance, 339–40  
   adopting price, 326

category, 340  
 choice of variables, 343–44  
 concentration, 327–29  
 context of market, cinemas, 323  
 control variables, 330–31  
 ‘cross-sectional’ data, 321, 322  
 data filtering, 342–43  
 data gathering, 341–42  
 data requirements, 324  
 direct quantitative measure, 332  
 econometric techniques, 320, 321, 332  
 endogeneity, 344–45  
 linear relationship, 345–46  
 market concentration, 320  
 market investigations, 322, 336–38  
 mergers  
   CC’ Optimax/Ultralase report, 335–36  
   CC’ survey evidence, 335  
   effect of entry and exit, 336  
   European Commission, 335  
   margin–concentration analysis, 335  
   merging parties, 334  
   potential impact, market structure,  
     333–34  
 ‘panel’ data, 321–22  
 pricing data, 324–26  
 quantitative techniques, 319  
 regression model, 331  
 relevant market definition, 338–39  
 and SCP, 321  
 ‘time series’ data, 321  
 UK and EU decisions, 332  
 ‘workhorse’ of empirical methods, 320

## Q

Qihoo/Tencent litigation  
 AML, 369  
 anti-monopoly case, 381  
 China and EU  
   dominance abuse case, 382–83  
   dominant position, 387–88  
   relevant geographic market, 385–87  
   relevant product market, 383–85

China instant messaging research report,  
   381  
 Chinese competition law, 371–72  
 dynamically competitive industries  
   economies of scale, 373–74  
   market, 374–75  
 Guangdong Court’s ruling  
   establishing dominance, 379–81  
   relevant geographic market, 378–79  
   relevant product market, 376–78  
 instant messaging software product (‘IM  
   product’) ‘QQ’, 369–71

## S

Scheme of Control (SOC), 569, 570,  
   574–79, 595, 599  
 Significant non-transitory *decrease* in the  
   quality (SSNDQ)  
   cautious approach, 157–58  
   ‘Cellophane fallacy’, 159  
   European Commission, 157  
   Facebook offers, 158–59  
   ‘free’ internet services, 158  
 Single and continuous infringement of  
   Article, 101  
   absolute requirements, 298  
   anti-competitive practices, 294  
   bananas, 302–04  
   bathroom fittings, 304–06  
   category, 296–97  
   Commission’s assessment, 295  
   Commission’s decision, 309  
   Commission’s evidential burden, 294  
   complementary factors, 298–300  
   controversial interpretation, 308  
   copper fittings, 306–07  
   description, 293–94  
   factors, 297  
   International Removal Services, 306–07  
   leniency applications, 296  
   persisting problems, 301  
   practitioner’s perspective  
     leniency, 311–13



- private actions for damages, 315–16
- settlement, 313–15
- Regulation 1/2003, 316–17
- and single repeat infringements, 297
- substantial period, 295
- traditional challenges, 300–01
- Social media and competition law
  - description, 152
  - dominance
    - Article 102 TFEU, 161–62
    - data portability, 170–71
    - exploitative abuses, 162–63
    - forcing decisions, 163–64
    - information shared online, 164–65
    - leveraging, 170
    - market share, 159–60
    - network, 160–61
    - onerous deletion, 166–67
    - tying and bundling, 167–70
  - Facebook* antitrust case, 151
  - Google* case, 151
  - IT sector, 149–50
  - market, 154
  - personal computer (PC), 150
  - reasoning, 153
  - revenues, 155–56
  - SSNDQ, 156–59
  - two-sided market, 154
- Spanish National Commission, 270
  - act *ex ante*, 353
  - Article 2.2 of the Act 3/2013, 357
  - European Commission, 350, 358
  - NCMC, 356–66
  - Netherlands and Estonia, 355
  - Preamble of Act 3/2013, 353
- Standard-Essential Patent (SEP), 2, 67–68
  - academic conversation, 54
  - antitrust gun, 54
  - China, 61–63
  - EU, 56–58
  - and FRAND, 53–54
  - injunctive relief and vexatious litigation
    - competition on the merits*, 65
    - EU Courts, 64
    - innovative markets, 64
    - Motorola Mobility, 67
    - standard-essential technology, 66
  - pragmatic approach, 55
  - Statement of Objections, 55
  - USA, 59–61
- State aid for rescue and restructuring
  - aid beneficiaries, 207
  - ailing companies, 221–22
  - amount and instrument, 219–21
  - commission communication, 232
  - companies located in assisted areas, 216
  - compensatory measures, 222
  - credible counterfactual, 233
  - economic insights and assumptions of
    - model, 214–15
  - economics
    - conditions, 210
    - EC, 210–11
    - government intervention, 211
    - NPV, 212–13
    - public intervention, 211
    - RRG, 210
  - efficiency, 208
  - EU rules, 207
  - information gathering and creation of
    - database, 215
  - market failure, 207
  - measurement, time, 216–17
  - member states, 218–19
  - modernization, 207
  - objectives and conditions, 209–10
  - own contribution, 223
  - public policy objectives, 215–16, 233
  - quantifiable distortion, 233
  - subsidising employment
    - amount of aid, 225–27, 231
    - annual salaries, 228
    - average across sectors, 224
    - cost per worker, 227, 230
    - medium-sized firms, 223
    - Member States, 229

Structure-conduct-performance (SCP), 321 23, 24, 32, 58, 64–66, 95, 98, 161, 166, 170, 237, 239, 488

**T**

Treaty on European Union (TEU), 8

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 6, 7, 10–14, 18–20,

**V**

Value added network service (VANS), 48–49