

Subject Index

A

- Abuse-alternative theories, 9–11
- Active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs), 86
 - contract manufacturing of FDPs, 108
 - observations, 110–12
- ADM. *See* *Archer Daniels Midlands* (ADM)
- AMEA. *See* Anti-monopoly Enforcement Authorities (AMEA)
- AML. *See* The Chinese Anti-monopoly Law (AML)
- Anatomical Therapeutic Classification (ATC), 88
- Announced Cartel Fines, 578
- Anti-competitive effects
 - Article 101(1), 511
 - competition law techniques, 507
 - Huierxun v. Shenzhen Pest Control Association*, 507
 - ‘insufficient competition’, 511
 - predatory pricing in *AKZO*, 509–510
 - Rainbow v. Johnson*, 508–509
 - Shenzhen Market Supervisory Authority, 507
 - sufficient competition, 510
- Anti-monopoly Enforcement Authorities (AMEA), 488
 - administrative and judicial interpretations, 481
 - administrative guidelines and regulations, 480
 - anti-cartel enforcement, 481
 - Chinese Courts, 479
 - Price Law, 482
 - price-related anti-monopoly cases, 480
 - price-related cartels, 481–485
- Antitrust class action
 - collective litigation
 - Canada, 47–49
 - CAT. *See* Competition Appeals Tribunal (CAT)
 - collective action recommendations, EU, 38–41
 - EU Member States, 43
 - forced arbitration clauses, 43–45
 - jurisdictions, 37
 - in Mexico, 45–47
 - UK government, 41–43
 - US class action, 37
 - hard-nosed decision, 29–30
 - opt-outs
 - direct purchaser antitrust claims, 51–54
 - government enforcement actions, 49
 - sine qua non of collective actions, 50–51
 - procedural decisions, 29
 - Rule 23(a), 32–36
 - stringent requirements, 31
 - Supreme Court, 30
 - US private enforcement, 29
 - US Supreme Court decisions, 30

API. *See* Active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs)

Archer Daniels Midlands (ADM), 423–424

ATC. *See* Anatomical Therapeutic Classification (ATC)

AVC. *See* Average variable cost (AVC)

Average variable cost (AVC), 655–656

B

BBA. *See* The British Bankers' Association (BBA)

BEE. *See* Black Economic Empowerment (BEE)

Behavioural remedies

conduct, 283

description, 283

firm's incentives, 283

Intel's acquisition of McAfee, 285

MOFCOM. *See* Ministry of Commerce of People's Republic of China (MOFCOM)

NCA. *See* National competition agency (NCA)

price regulation, 285

substantial amount of resources, 283

Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), 639

The British Bankers' Association (BBA), 164

The 'By object' approach, 186–188

C

Canadian anti-cartel law, 561–563

Canadian Competition Bureau international context, 579–582

anti-cartel law, 561–563

anti-cartel measures, 557

cartel cases and corporate penalties, 563–567

Competition Act, 558

criminal convictions, private parties, 582–584

enforcement over time: 1990–2015, 570–579

European Commission's (EC's) antitrust program, 559

GDP. *See* Gross domestic product (GDP)

individual penalties, 567

international cartels, 560

major findings, 560

non-representative cases, 559

one-fourth of all cartels fixed prices, 558

PIC data, 570

resources and competency, 567–570

severity and recovery of fines, 584–588

Canadian Competition Bureau (CCB), 272

Canadian Competition Commissioners, 1990–2016, 573

Cartel cases and corporate penalties, 563–567

Cartel fines, 1990–Oct. 2016, 576, 577

CAT. *See* Competition Appeals Tribunal (CAT)

CCB. *See* Canadian Competition Bureau (CCB)

Chimei Innolux Corporation of Taiwan, 435

The Chinese Anti-monopoly Law (AML), 479

Chinese competition law

AML and Price Law

AMEA. *See* Anti-monopoly

Enforcement Authorities (AMEA)

Antitrust intervention, 489

Article 46, 490

Chongqing Price Sectors, 488

hardcore restriction, 489

horizontal price fixing, 485–488

HubeiYilin Price Sector, 489

LCD panels case, 488

NDRC and local price sectors, 490

- Regulation on Administrative Penalties for Pricing Violations, 490
- standardized approach
 - anticompetitive effects, 507–511
 - effects-based approach, 491–493
 - object test, 493–497
 - private litigation proof, 501–503
 - public enforcement and private litigation, RPM, 497–498
 - public enforcement proof, 498–501
 - reconciling the gap of burden of proof, 503–506
- Clayton Act, 78, 79
- CMO. *See* Contract manufacturing (CMO)
- ‘CoCo bonds’, 259
- Coherent application
 - Article 101
 - Allianz Hungária*, 404
 - Cartes Bancaires*, 402, 404–405
 - competitors/non-competitors, 405
 - ECN. *See* European Competition Network (ECN)
 - economic and legal context, 404, 405
 - levels of analysis, 402–403
 - MFC clause, 403
 - NCA. *See* National competition agency (NCA)
 - RPM. *See* Resale price maintenance (RPM)
 - types of restrictions, 401–402
 - Article 102
 - Court of Justice, 407
 - effects-based approach, 406
 - EU competition policy, 409
 - form-based approach, 407
 - issue of consistency, 407
 - market power, 406, 408
 - non-dominant firms, 408
 - restriction or conduct, 408
 - soft by object category, 409
 - type of agreement, 408
 - types of conduct, 406
 - Van den Bergh* case, 406
 - Atlantic Container Line*, 410
 - consistency, 390
 - consumer welfare objective, 411
 - effects-based approach
- BERs. *See* The Commission’s Block Exemption Regulations (BERs)
 - Commission’s enforcement activity, 397
 - consumer welfare, 397
 - Delimitis*, 394
 - EU competition policy, 393
 - Fatty Acids* case, 394
 - form-based approach, 396
 - merger control, 394
 - qualitative/quantitative way, 394
 - Regulation 1/ 2003, 397
 - restrictions and agreements, 396
 - UK Tractors* case, 394
- VRBER. *See* Vertical Restraints Block Exemption Regulation (VRBER)
- VRGL. *See* Vertical Restraints Guidelines (VRGL)
- elimination of competition, 411
- EU competition law, 410
- The General Court’s *Intel* judgment, 410
- monopoly, 411
- object and effect restriction, 409
- by object restrictions
 - absence of efficiencies, 401
 - Article 101(1) TFEU, 398
 - Article 101(3) TFEU, 398
 - assessment of agreements, 401
 - Cartes Bancaires*, 399
 - competitors, 400
 - Court of Justice, 398
 - effects-based approach, 397–398
 - market-sharing agreement, 399
 - ‘By Object’ Guidance, 399

price-fixing cartel agreements, 400
 technology transfer guidelines, 399
 VRGL. *See* Vertical Restraints
 Guidelines (VRGL)
Post Denmark I and II, 410
 pro-and anticompetitive effects, 410
 soft by object category, 410
Comap v. Commission, 423, 425–426
 The Commission's Block Exemption
 Regulations (BERs), 393
 Competition Appeals Tribunal (CAT), 43
 Contingent capital, 259
 Contract manufacturing (CMO), 108
 Court of Justice of the European Union
 (ECJ). *See also* FRAND-encumbered
 SEPs
 abuse, 222–223
 Article 102 TFEU analysis, 217
 Commission's decisions, 214
 dominance, 220–222
 'exceptional circumstances' in Huawei,
 224–225
 The FRAND commitment, 219
 Landesgericht Düsseldorf, 215
 market definition, 219–220
 objective justification, 225–227
 products using technical reading on
 patent, 213
 SEP-holders and licensees, 214
 'smartphones war' in 2011–2012,
 216–217
 SSOs. *See* Standard Setting
 Organizations (SSOs)
 'unwilling licensee' concept. *See*
 'Unwilling licensee' concept

D

Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) airport, 676
 DFW airport. *See* Dallas/Fort Worth
 (DFW) airport
 DOJ. *See* The U.S. Department of Justice
 (DOJ)

E

EC. *See* European Commission (EC)
 ECJ. *See* Court of Justice of the European
 Union (ECJ)
 ECN. *See* European Competition
 Network (ECN)
 E-Commerce
 distributors' exclusive territories/custo-
 mer groups, 298
 e-mails/approaches, 296
 outright ban, 297–298
 EEA. *See* European Economic Area (EEA)
 EphMRA. *See* European Pharmaceutical
 Marketing Research Association
 (EphMRA)
 EU Cartel Enforcement
 antitrust enforcement authority, 350
 cartel duration and detection method,
 353–378
 creating and maintaining cartels,
 337–339
 decisions following ex officio cartel
 investigations, 351
 definition, 327
 ECN. *See* European Competition
 Network (ECN)
 European Commission, 328
 European Parliament and Council, 332
 exclusive reliance on leniency, 350–352
 facilitation, 341–343
 immunity recipients, relative market
 shares and recidivism, 379–388
 intelligence and evidence, 335–337
 Leniency Notice, 328–331
 lowering of the penalty level, 340–341
 market structure, 348–349
 negative moral effects and the problem
 of recidivism, 344–348
 statistics, 333–335
 well-designed leniency programme, 350
 EU competition law, 432
 EU Customs Code, 439–440

- European Commission (EC), 272, 533–534
- European Commission's (EC's) antitrust program, 559
- European Commission's Pharmaceutical Merger Control Practice
 - market definition
 - Commission's methodology, 94–95
 - molecule/active ingredient, 87
 - multi-molecule markets in practice, 91–94
 - OTC markets, 88–89
 - single molecule *v.* multi-molecule markets, 89–91
 - therapeutic and economic substitution, 87
 - observations, Commission's practice, 86–87
 - remedies
 - noteworthy cases, 113–115
 - pharmaceutical sector
 - purchaser requirements, 112
 - rights and assets, 112
 - substantive assessment
 - combined market shares, 95
 - Group 1 (Plus) markets, 96
 - market entry and exit, 100–102
 - OTC markets, 102–103
 - overlaps specific versus 'big picture' theories of harm, 98–100
 - portfolio-driven sales, 103
 - in Sweden, 103
 - unilateral effects analysis and pricing, 96–98
- European Competition Network (ECN), 332, 403–404
- European Economic Area (EEA)
 - Commission's fining policy, 432–434
 - dispute or regulatory matter, 431
 - experiment, 432
- European Pharmaceutical Marketing Research Association (EphMRA), 88
- F**
 - Fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms, 199, 210
 - Fatty Acids* case, 394
 - FCA. *See* Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)
 - FDPs. *See* Finished dose pharmaceuticals (FDPs)
 - Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), 31
 - Financial benchmarks
 - Barclays' alleged manipulation, 161
 - collusion, defined, 175
 - currency exchange and crude oil trading markets, 162
 - information exchanges in. *See* Information exchanges in financial benchmarks
 - interest rate derivatives, 166
 - interest rate swap products, 161
 - Libor, manipulation of
 - consumer welfare effect, 175
 - EU law qualification, 174–175
 - individuals at different banks, 171
 - panel bank submissions, 171
 - submission and swaps traders, 171
 - US developments, 172–174
 - Libor under Article 101(1) TFEU, 163
 - manipulation of, 168–170
 - need for, 165–166
 - OTC markets, 166–168
 - regulatory action, 170–171
 - regulatory instruments, 163
 - relevant market power, 178–180
 - stoic beginnings, 164–165
 - type 1 and type 2 manipulation, 176–177
 - type 3 manipulation, 177–178
 - US and UK regulators, 162
- Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), 168
- 2006 Fining Guidelines, 434
- Finished dose pharmaceuticals (FDPs), 86
- Fiscal aid selectivity

boundary between general and virtual measures, 550–552
 1997 Code of Conduct, 536
 Commission and Member States, 537–538
 description, 533
 distortive effects, 535
 EC. *See* European Commission (EC)
 European Treaties, 536
 fact-intensive analysis, 541
 goals, 536
 indirect microeconomic effects, 541–543
 macroeconomic and microeconomic measures, 535
 relevant case law, 538–540
 tax matters, 534
 Treaty's provisions, 536
 types of controversial measures, 541
 virtual general measures
 amortization benefit, 546–547
 business environment and investments, 550
 Commission's control, 545
 de facto selectivity, 549
 discrimination between economic operators, 549
 domestic venture capital investments, 544
 Italian textile case, 545
 public financial resources, 544
 recipients/categories of recipients, 550
 'same legal and factual category' concept, 547
 Santander and Autogrill cases, 548
 State aid law, 545
 statistic data/plausibility analysis, 548
 subsidies/soft loans/guarantees, 545
 FRAND. *See* Fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms
 The FRAND commitment, 219

FRAND-encumbered SEPs
 electronic devices, 217
 hold-up problem, 218
 standardization agreements, 217–218
 standard-setting process, 217
 FRCP. *See* Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)

G

GDP. *See* Gross domestic product (GDP)
 General Electric's (GE's) acquisition of Honeywell, 278
 Global antitrust policy research, 240
 Gross domestic product (GDP), 557

H

Healthcare quality, US Hospital merger cases
 agencies and US Courts, 611
 annual recurring and capital avoidance savings, 614
 Clayton Act, 616
 defendants' alleged quality claims, 617
 distinct from cost savings, 612
 equity concern, 609–611
 FTC Commissioner Tim Muris in 2002, 611–612
 FTC v. St. Luke's Health System case, 614–615
 merger's alleged anticompetitive effects, 613
 merging entities, 618
 National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States case, 616
 Penn State Hershey Medical Center case, 617
 primary care physicians, 615
 quality arguments, 611
 Highest common denominator effect, 270
 Homogeneous goods markets, 58–60
 Horizontal merger guidelines, homogeneous goods industries

- M.6905-INEOS AG (INEOS) and Solvay SA, 62–64
- M.6471-Outokumpu Oyj (Outokumpu)/Inoxum, 60–62
- Huierxun v. Shenzhen Pest Control Association*, 491–493

I

- Individual penalties, 567
- Information exchanges in financial benchmarks
 - the ‘by object’ approach, 186–188
 - EU case law, developments in, 181–184
 - pros and cons of, 181
 - purpose of, 180
 - traders, brokers and dealers, 180
 - type 3 manipulation, 184–186
- Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), 109
- International Cartel Detections per year by Canada Peaked 2010–2015, 571
- Interview with Mr Marín Quemada, 525–531
- IPRs. *See* Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs)

L

- LCD panels
 - cartel infringement, 440
 - categories of sales, 435
 - Court of Justice, 437–438
 - EU Customs Code, 439–440
 - 2006 Fining Guidelines, 435, 440
 - General Court, 437
 - indirect sales, 435
 - infringement, 443–444
 - Innolux, 436
 - ‘internal’ sales., 437
 - jurisdiction, 441–443
 - non-bis in idem argument*, 444–449
 - price-fixing, 439
 - televisions and electronic notebooks, 434
- Long-Term Evolution (LTE), 199
- LTE. *See* Long-Term Evolution (LTE)

M

- Merger and Acquisition (M&A),
 - Pharmaceutical merger
 - branded companies, 451
 - cautions, 476–477
 - competition, 460–463
 - cross-market efficiencies, 473, 474
 - efficiency claim/defense, 464–468
 - emerging markets, 454
 - institutional environment, 474–476
 - issue of access, 459–460
 - local pharmaceutical companies, 453
 - MNCs. *See* Multinational Corporations (MNCs)
 - monopoly, 470–472
 - out-of-market efficiencies, 473
 - post-merger R&D performance, 452
 - theoretical framework
 - competition assessment, 457
 - consumer theories, 456
 - consumer welfare standard, 457
 - market shares, 456
 - MES. *See* Minimum Efficient Scale (MES)
 - OECD. *See* Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
 - political foundations, 458
 - socio-economic realities, 459
 - substantive competition law, 458
 - welfare standards, 469–470
- Merger control regime
 - PICs *See* Public interest considerations (PICs)
 - SA. *See* South Africa (SA)
- Merger remedies
 - behavioural remedies, 283–286
 - effects-based conflicts, 272–275
 - ‘highest common denominator’ effect, 270
- International Competition Network, 269
- MNEs. *See* Multinational enterprises (MNEs)

NCA. *See* National competition agency (NCA)

OECD. *See* Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

post-merger enforcement, 286–289

short-term risks, 270, 271

structural remedies, 278–282

substantive conflicts, 275–278

types of, 271–272

MES. *See* Minimum Efficient Scale (MES)

Microsoft and Google cases

Abuse-alternative theories, 9–11

Article 102 TFEU, 7

Article 102(b), 12–13

basic flaws, theories, 15–18

Commission's guidance paper, 6

cost, 8

customers and, 7

dominant company, 14–15

'essential facility' principle, 21

exclusionary abuse, 27

foreclosure, 18–19

hardware and software, 6

harm to consumers, 13–14

legal duty to contract, 22–24

monopoly power, 8

novel theories, 24–26

pro-competitive foreclosure, 5

publicized cases, 6

remedies, 19–20

URL. *See* Uniform resource locator (URL)

Minimum Efficient Scale (MES), 454

Ministry of Commerce of People's Republic of China (MOFCOM), 284, 286, 480

MNCs. *See* Multinational Corporations (MNCs)

MNEs. *See* Multinational enterprises (MNEs)

Morphable ownership, 256

Multinational Corporations (MNCs), 453

Multinational enterprises (MNEs), 267

anticompetitive/procompetitive, 282

in global market, 280–281

international mergers, 272

national welfare, 273

productive assets in multiple jurisdictions, 284–285

N

National competition agency (NCA), 267, 268, 278, 279, 284, 403–404

anticompetitive harm in post-merger world, 270

CCB. *See* Canadian Competition Bureau (CCB)

collaboration and communication, 268

DOJ. *See* The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)

EC. *See* European Commission (EC)

job/export growth, 274

in merger remedies, 269

procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive harms, 272–273

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 480

National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States case, 616

NCA. *See* National competition agency (NCA)

NDRC. *See* The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)

Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT)

AVC. *See* Average variable cost (AVC)

Brooke Group court, 656–657

Chicago School, 654

costs

description, 658–659

efficiency, 660–662

rationality, 659–660

Harvard School, 654

legal tests, 655

market power, 657–658

microeconomic models, 654

- post-Chicago scholars, 654
- predation effects
 - Brooke* Group, 668–669
 - cost tests, 677
 - customary inverse relationship, 667
 - demand curve, 673
 - DFW airport. *See* Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) airport
 - expense of rivals, 667
 - Fifth Circuit, 675
 - generic cigarette purchases, 670–672
 - Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp.*, 668
 - low-cost carriers, 677
 - monopolization, 673, 674
 - oligopoly pricing, 670
 - pre-*Brooke* Group decision, 666
 - single-firm predation, 666
 - Sixth Circuit, 678
 - supra-competitive prices, 668
 - Tenth Circuit, 676
 - transatlantic antitrust agencies, 673
 - transportation costs, 673
 - US federal appellate courts, 665
 - viability of, 674
- rationality, competition and efficiency concepts, 655
- recoupment. *see* Recoupment
- The Nestlé/Pfizer Nutrition merger, 280
- Non-controlling financial holding
 - anticompetitive effects, 245, 260
 - centralized and decentralized approach, 263
 - ‘CoCo bonds’, 259
 - collusive/anticompetitive signalling, 242
 - ‘coordinated effects’, 244
 - corporate lawyers, 242
 - debt arrangements, 259
 - decentralized approach, 261–262
 - disempowering, 243
 - economic research, 248
 - ‘empty voting’ and ‘hidden ownership’ techniques, 259–260
 - in EU competition law
 - Competition Commission, 250–251, 257
 - corporate issues, 255
 - ECJ case law and Commission’s decisional practice, 252–253
 - economics assessment, 250
 - European Merger Regulation, 253–254, 256, 257
 - General Court’s approach, 250
 - ‘material influence’ test, UK authorities, 251
 - morphable ownership, 256
 - national financial market laws, 256
 - passive investment, 254
 - pre-merger toehold, 249
 - regulatory gap, 249
 - Tribunal, 251
 - European Member States’ corporate laws and financial environments, 258
 - EU-specific rules, 262
 - financial counter-incentives to competition, 242
 - global antitrust policy research, 240
 - hedge funds, 246–247
 - horizontal and vertical holdings, 247
 - hybrid instruments, 246
 - implications, 244–245
 - information sharing and competitors’ industrial policy, 242
 - lawmakers, 245
 - linguistic ambiguity, 241–242
 - longer-term counter-incentives, 260
 - national competition and financial market authorities, 261
 - ‘passive and active force’, 246
 - pre-merger context, 258
 - price of the new entrant, 247
 - theory of voting power, 248–249
 - ‘unilateral effect’, 243

NPT. *See* Neoclassical Price Theory (NPT)

O

OECD. *See* Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

Orange-Book-Standard case, 200

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 269, 455

OTC markets. *See* Over-the-Counter (OTC) markets

Over-the-Counter (OTC) markets, 88–89, 102–103

customer market, 167–168

financial instruments, 166

inter-dealer market, 168

‘plain vanilla’ interest rate swap, 166–167

P

PAEs. *See* Patent assertion entities (PAEs)

Patent assertion entities (PAEs), 67

Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), 209

Patent trolls

conflicting economic analyses, 75–78

EU’s position vis-a-vis patent assertion entities, 83

FRANDness, 84

FRAND terms, 83

Google/Motorola merger clearance, 68

Innovation Act-Congress’ third legislative attempt, 68

Lottery-ticket trolls, 73

meta-rules, 84

patent ecosystems

concerns & regulatory challenges, 72–73

technological advance & patents-principles & welfare trade-offs, 69–70

US regulatory context & trends, 70–72

patent trends, 69

public perception & economic reasoning, 74–75

US judicial, federal and state reforms, 82

Penalized International Cartels, 1990–2015, 574

PICs. *See* Public interest considerations (PICs)

Pipeline products

Commission’s approach, 107–108
framework, 106

Novartis/GSK Oncology, 107

parties’ competitive position, 104

Teva/Cephalon, 106

types, 105

Polypropylene case, 416

Post-merger enforcement, 286–289

Pricing incentives, 58–60

PTAB. *See* Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)

Public distancing and liability

Anic presumption, 415, 418, 420–422

anticompetitive intention, 414

anticompetitive meeting and concrete behavior, 418

cartel law, 414

concerted practices, 416

coordination and cooperation, 415–416

Court of First Instance, 416–417

Court of Justice, 416

in dubio contra reo, 427

in dubio pro reo, 427

elements, 415

EU Courts, 413

liability, 418–420

limited judicial review, 425–426

Polypropylene case, 416

public distancing requirement, 427–429

requirement, 422–425

Public interest considerations (PICs)

categories of, 628
 competition authorities, 629
 evidence and expert testimony,
 642–643
 merger proceedings, 629–632
 on merger process, 626–627
 public interest grounds, 629
 in SA. *See* South Africa (SA)
 undertakings and conditions,
 644–647

R

Recoupment
 competition, 663–665
 rationality, 662–663
 Regulation 1/ 2003, 433
 Re-pricing, oligopolistic tacit collusion
 blind spot, 120–121
 disruption, 123–125
 EU Member States, 136–138
 framework, 125–126
 pro-competitive impact of disruption,
 121–123
 pro-competitive promises, 119
 type I errors, 129–132
 type II errors, 127–129
 type III costs
 systems benefits, 135–136
 systems costs, 132–135
 Resale price maintenance (RPM), 403,
 480
 Research & development (R&D), 552
 RPM. *See* Resale price maintenance
 (RPM)

S

SA. *See* South Africa (SA)
 SEPs. *See* Standard-essential patents (SEPs)
 Sherman Act, 80–82
 South Africa (SA), 626
 ability of SMEs owned by HDI,
 639–640
 employment

Labour Act, 634
 merger-specific retrenchments,
 635–636
 number and percentage of employees
 retrenched, 636–638
 type of employees affected and
 alternative employment opportu-
 nities, 638–639
 industrial sector/region, ability of, 641
 national industries, ability of, 642
 tribunal decisions LM (1999–2014),
 632–633
 SSOs. *See* Standard Setting Organizations
 (SSOs)
 Standard-essential patents (SEPs)
 Commission and Advocate General,
 195, 196
 competition policy measures, 193
 cost-benefit analysis, 192–193
 ‘essential input’ for licensee, 194
 European Union authorities, 191
 implementers of standards and consu-
 mers, 192
 licensing costs, 202–205
 licensed portfolios, 194
 marginal harm to consumers from
 validity challenges, 208–211
 no-challenge clauses, 192, 193
 rebalancing, 194
 scrutiny under
 Article 101 of the TFEU,
 196–199
 Article 102 of the TFEU, 199–202
 TTBER. *See* Technology Transfer
 Block Exemption Regulation
 (TTBER)
 validity challenge of individual,
 205–208
 Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs),
 216
 Stoic beginnings, 164–165
 Structural remedies
 anticompetitive harms, 279, 281

Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger, 281–282
 competition to the pre-merger level, 278
 customer/input foreclosure, 280
 global markets, 281
 highest common denominator effect, 282
 multiple jurisdictions, 280
 NCA. *See* National competition agency (NCA)
 The Nestlé/Pfizer Nutrition merger, 280
 regional markets, 282

T

Targeted Transparency System, 259
 Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (TTBER), 191–192
 Theory of voting power, 248–249
 Third-party platforms
 absolute ban on the use of, 298–300
 distribution channels, 293
 features, 294
 internet sales, 291–293
 logo clause, 302–303
 online platforms, 295
 popularity ranking, 294
 qualitative criteria, 301–302
 qualitative requirements, 304
 selective distribution systems, 295–296
 suppliers, 292–293
 suppliers/distributors and end-customers, 294
Toshiba v. Commission, 424–426
Total Marketing Services v. Commission, 424
 Tribunal decisions LM (1999–2014), 632–633
 TTBER. *See* Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (TTBER)

U

UK Tractors case, 394
 Uniform resource locator (URL), 8
 Union competition policy, 432
 ‘Unwilling licensee’ concept
 alleged infringer/potential licensee, 229–230
 article 102 TFEU, 227
 fundamental rights and freedoms, 236–237
 licensing framework, 228
 SEP-holder’s pursuit
 alleged infringer/potential licensee, 229–230
 detriment of consumers, 232–233
 discrimination, 234–235
 exploitative abuse under article 102(A) TFEU, 233–234
 input essential on downstream market, 232
 objective justification, 233
 obligations for, 228–229
 refusal to license, 231–232
 vexatious litigation, 235–236
 URL. *See* Uniform resource locator (URL)
 US Antitrust Standards & Alternative Remedies
 alternative remedies, 81–82
 Clayton Act, 78, 79
 Sherman Act, 80–82
 The US Department of Justice (DOJ), 272
 US Hospital merger cases. *See also* Healthcare quality, US Hospital merger cases
 actual/potential competitors, 597
 analytical framework, 620–622
 anti-competitive effects, 599–600
 bargaining leverage, 596
 competitive market forces, 593

contract negotiation between private
 payors and the hospitals, 596
FTC and US courts
 anticompetitive effects, 606–609
 geographic market, 602–605
FTC’s decision making policy reveal,
 622–624
higher reimbursement rates, 596
information technologies, 595
insufficient guidance, 619–620
insurance company’s network, 595
medical research, 594
price and non-price terms, 597, 598
procompetitive efficiencies, 600–602
product and geographic market, 598–599
quality, concept, 594
services/administrative expenses,
 duplication of, 594
test analytical process, 598

V

Van den Bergh case, 406
VBER. *See* Vertical Block Exemption
 Regulation (VBER)
Vertical Block Exemption Regulation
 (VBER), 296
Vertical Restraints Block Exemption
 Regulation (VRBER) of 1999, 395
Vertical Restraints Guidelines (VRGL) of
 2000, 395, 399
VRBER. *See* Vertical Restraints Block
 Exemption Regulation (VRBER)
VRGL. *See* Vertical Restraints Guidelines
 (VRGL)

W

Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 448
Windsurfing International, Inc. v.
 Commission, 198