

# Subject Index

## A

- Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), 474–477
- Abuse of buyer power
  - assessment of abuses, 293–296
  - competition law, 292–293
  - countervailing buyer power, 290–291
- Abuse of dominance
  - Facebook, 412–414
  - Google Adsense, 414–416
  - Google Android, 414–416
  - Google Search
    - discriminatory treatment, 408
    - elimination of incentives, 409
    - essential facilities test, 410
    - exceptional circumstances, 404, 412
    - exorbitant interpretation, 405
    - factual-economic analysis, 411
    - innovative objections, 404
    - non-dominated market, 411
    - non-indispensable competitive, 405
    - undertakings, 406–407
- Actavis* case, 481–483
- American Soda Ash Export Cartel (ANSAC), 319
- Anticompetitive conduct
  - broader considerations, 317–320
  - ex ante and ex post State entanglement, 302
  - foreign markets, 299
  - foreign State's entanglement, 313–317
- Antitrust regulation of loyalty rebates in China
  - analogy of tying and bundling, 621–622
  - Art. 17(1)(g), 614
  - characteristics
    - individualization/standardization, 618–619
    - retroactiveness, 617–618
    - single-product and multi-product scenario, 619
  - effects on competition
    - anticompetitive, 619–620
    - pro-anticompetitive, 620–621
  - exclusive dealing, 623–624
  - predatory pricing, 622–623
  - SAIC, 613, 614
- Tetra Pak* case
  - exclusionary effects-based approach
    - looming, 624–626
  - individualized target, 614
  - insufficiency of contextualized effects-analysis, 626–627
  - market context, 615–616
  - non-contestable products, 616–617
  - retroactively cumulative rebates, 614–615
  - threshold interval, 614
  - underdeveloped theory of harm, 627–629

theory of harm, EU  
 “all-circumstances” framework,  
   CJEU, 631–632  
 concept of loyalty rebates, 629–630  
 exclusionary effect, 630–631  
 exclusive dealing analogy, 634–635  
*Intel* case, 632–634

#### Arbitrability of EU Competition Law

antitrust claims, 70–72  
 Art. 101 TFEU, 68, 75–77  
 Art. 102 TFEU, 68, 75–77  
 Art. 106 TFEU, 78–80  
 Art. 107 TFEU, 80–82  
 Art. 108 TFEU, 80–82  
 CDC, 69, 85  
 CJEU, 85–90  
 definition, 67  
 explicit recognition, 73–74  
 implicit recognition, 74–75  
 MCR, 82–83  
 remedies, 83–85

#### C

Cartel Damage Claims (CDC), 69, 85, 89  
 Centralized procedure (CP), 477  
 Committee for Medicinal Products for  
   Human Use (CHMP), 478  
 Competition and Markets Authority  
   (CMA)  
   cartel offence, 145  
   CDO, 149, 150, 155  
   director disqualification, 124  
   enforcement discretion, 147  
 Competition disqualification order (CDO)  
   anti-competitive conduct, 154  
   CMA, 149, 155  
   directors, 149–152  
   individuals, 150  
   protection of public, 152  
 Concerned Member States (CMSs), 478

#### D

Digital markets  
   ad intermediation services, 399  
   anticompetitive conducts and mergers, 400  
   applicability, 397  
   indirect network effects, 398  
   market power, 400–403  
   online advertising, 398–399  
 Dual pricing system  
   Art. 101(3), TFEU, 116–118  
   *Glaxo Spain*, 115–116

#### E

E-commerce, 51–53, 278  
 Egyptian competition regime  
   Art. 345 and 346, penal code, 642–644,  
     653, 654  
*Cement cartel* fine  
   average selling price and cost, 648  
   deterrence, 652–653  
   direct economic loss, 649  
   estimation, 648  
   and harm, 650  
   legal errors, 651  
   method, 652  
   monetary sanctioning policy, 652  
   price overcharge, 649  
   Shavell theory, 652, 653  
 EU competition law, 638  
 fining regime, 645–647  
 imprisonment sentence  
   Art. 6, ECL, 639  
   Art. 22, ECL, 640, 653  
   *Cartel* case, 640–642  
 monetary sanctions, imprisonment,  
   644–645  
 protection, 638  
 Sherman Act, 637–638  
 Electricité de France (EDF)/CGN deci-  
   sion, SOEs

autonomy from the State, 593–599  
 Commission's analysis, 611  
 coordination of commercial conduct,  
     595, 599–601  
 EU antitrust law, 3  
 EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), Chinese  
     SOEs  
     accumulation of turnover, undertakings,  
         585–586  
     acquisitions, 585  
     assessment, 587  
     jurisdictional notice, 586–587  
     'single economic unit' doctrine, 586  
 EU regulatory framework, 477–479  
 European Economic Area (EEA), 369, 489  
 European Medicines Agency (EMA), 478  
 European Patent Office (EPO), 501  
 European Union (EU) Competition Law  
     dominance  
         abuse of (*see* Abuse of dominance)  
         analytical framework, 393  
     dynamic competition and market con-  
         testability, 416  
     indirect network effects, 417  
     market definition and market power  
         digital markets (*see* Digital markets)  
         indirect network effects, 394  
         multi-sided platforms and network  
             effects, 395–397  
     restrictive effects, 417  
 Exclusion payments, 472

**F**

Fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory  
     (FRAND). *See* Level discrimination  
     and FRAND  
 Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 480  
 Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 474  
 Free and Open Source Software (FOSS)  
     Program  
     assessment of mergers  
         analysis scheme, 170–174  
         pre-and post merger, 169

commercial software, 161–162  
 intellectual property rights, 159, 160  
 licences  
     classification, 162  
     and merger remedies, 174–175  
     revocation, 163  
 merger control, EU  
     assessment, 163–164  
     Cisco/Tandberg, 168–169  
     IBM/Telelogic, 164  
     Oracle/Sun Microsystems, 164–168

**G**

German Act against Restrictions of  
     Competition (Gesetz gegen  
     Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB)),  
     292

**I**

Independence of Chinese SOEs  
     Central SASAC, 592–593  
     decision practice, 592  
     EDF/CGN decision (*see* Electricité de  
         France (EDF)/CGN decision, SOEs)  
*Intel* case  
     AEC test, 252  
     Commission and guidance, 250  
     economic theories, 252  
     effect of rebates on competition  
     exclusivity rebates, 252  
     Guidance, Commission, 251–252  
     legal assessment of rebates  
         dominant and abuse of position,  
             247–248  
         genuine quantity rebates schemes,  
             248–249  
         *Post Danmark II*, 248–250  
 OEMs, 251  
 Opinion of Advocate-General Wahl  
     AEC test, 263–266  
     comparable practices and inconsis-  
         tency rules, 266  
     effects-based analysis, rebates, 253

- meaning and role of presumptions, 258–261
- object of the law, 253–255
- rebate classification, 255–258
- threshold, establishing ‘capability’ of harm, 262–263

#### Internet sales

- absolute restriction, 53–54
- contractual marketplace, 55
- de-facto marketplace bans, 55–56
- intra-brand competition, 60
- qualitative criteria, 54–55

### K

*Kimberly Clark/Scott* case, 295

### L

Legitimacy of individual sanctions, UK

Competition Law

Cartel offence

- CMA, 148–149
- ERRA13, 144–146
- removing dishonesty, 188 EA02, 146–147

CDOs, 149–156

CMA, 122, 124

deterrence theory, 122, 123

enforcement strategy, 125–130

legislative drafting, 130–134

OFT (*see* Office of Fair Trading (OFT))

Level discrimination and FRAND

abuse of dominance, 236–238

advantages and disadvantages, 223–224

charging royalties, 222

compensation of SEP holders, 220

contractual/quasi-contractual

obligation, 217

end-product manufacturers, 221–223

ETSI IPR policy, 215, 218–219

incentives, 219–220, 223

licences, 215, 224–225

risk, 219

social welfare, 221–222

standard-compliant products, 217–218

litigation, 214–215

multi-component products, 215

non-practising undertakings

anti-competitive effect, 235–236

end-product manufacturers licence, 233–234

‘exceptional circumstances’ category, 234–235

Indispensability Condition, 230, 235

legitimate expectation condition, 235

*Motorola*, 231

*Rambus*, 232–233

rights, public employment agency, 233

*Samsung*, 231

third party licence, 230

SEP holder, 213–215

SSOs, 213

vertically integrated undertakings

*Huawei v. ZTE*, 227–228

injunctions, 228–230

IP rights policy, 225

*Motorola*, 226–227

recall of products, 228–230

refusal to licence, component manufacturer, 229

*Samsung*, 226

### M

Marketing authorization (MA), 477–479

Marketing strategy, 273–275

Merger Control Regulation (MCR), 82–83

Multilateral interchange fee (MIF), 5

Multi-sidedplatforms, markets

advertising-funded media act, 571

and one-sided, 566–567

Art. 102 TFEU, 582

*CEAHR* case, 576

competitive environment, 574

customers interaction, 565

delimiting markets, 564

differences, 571–572

digital economy, 563  
 economic properties, 567  
 emergence of, 564  
 exchanges, 571  
 hardware/software paradigm, 565  
*Idealtypus*, 567  
 identifications, groups of costumers, 566  
 indirect network effects, 576  
 intermarket analysis  
     *British Airways* case, 580  
     business conduct, 579  
     competitive assessment, 577–578  
     dominance and non-dominated market, 579, 581  
     indirect network effects, 578  
     market power, 578  
     *Tetra Pak II* case, 579–580  
 legal perspectives, 567  
 LinkedIn, 564–565  
 market definition  
     costs, services, 570–571  
         economic tools, 569–570  
         market delimitation, 569  
         market power, 568–569  
         multi-sidedness, 569  
     *MasterCard* case, 572, 574–575  
     *Microsoft/LinkedIn* case, 577  
     network effects, 567  
     one-platform-market box, 572  
     primary goods, 575  
     professional and non-professional customers, 573–574  
     services or goods, 576  
     theory of, 566  
     transaction, 572, 573  
     *Travelpart/Worldspan* case, 576–577  
     *Visa* case, 572  
 Mutual recognition procedure (MRP), 477

## N

National competition authorities (NCAs)

ACM, 366–368  
 BMA-ABC, 370–371  
 cross-border cartel sanctioning  
     decentralized competition enforcement, 383–384  
     political consensus, 384–386  
     robust procedural rules, 386–388  
     safeguards, 388–391  
 EEA, 369  
 legal assessment  
     comity considerations and deference, 375  
     decentralization of enforcement, 380  
     domestic effects, 378  
     individual violations, 373  
     legal certainty, 382–383  
     Member States, 377, 379  
     **NCAs** to fine foreign effects, 372–373, 376  
     single and continuous infringement, 374  
 NCAs. *See* National competition authorities (NCAs)  
 New Drug Application (NDA), 474, 477

## O

Office of Fair Trading (OFT)  
     bid-rigging and price-fixing cartel, 137  
     civil enforcement power, 135, 136  
     criminalization, 138  
     price-fixing of air passenger, 139–142  
 Online marketplace bans  
     anti-competitive strategies, 47–48  
     Art. 101(3), TFEU, 64  
     dynamic competition, 48–50  
     E-commerce, 51–53  
     innovation and competitive pressure, 47  
     inter-brand competition, 60  
     Internet sales, 53–56  
     intra-brand competition, 60  
     legal framework, EU, 56–59

selective distribution agreements, 51–53  
 small and medium-sized retailers, 62–63  
 vertical block exemption, 64, 65

## P

Parallel trade in pharmaceutical sector

Art. 101 TFEU, 97–100

Art. 102 TFEU

abusive conduct, 102–104

dominance, 100–102

dual pricing (*see* Dual pricing)

*Glaxo Greece*, 105

intra-brand competition, 95

market integration and accessibility, 93

objective justification, 107–108

pricing and public reimbursement, 94

quota system (*see* Quota system)

withdrawal, 106–107

Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO),  
 501

Patent settlement agreements, 472

Pay-for-delay settlement. *See* Reverse pay-  
 ment patent settlement agreements  
 (RPSAs)

Price theory, 277

Private enforcement

definition, 3–4

Directive 2014/104

binding effect, 30

compensation for loss, 25–26

consensual dispute resolution, 37–38

disclosure of evidence, 31

joint and several liability, 26–30

leniency statements and settlement

submissions, 31–35

public enforcement proceedings, 35–37

TFEU, 24

finances and damages, 40–41

leniency programmes, 41–45

MIF, 5

public enforcement, 4

Regulation 1/2003

EU Court of Justice, 7–9

notification and authorization system,  
 10–11

public enforcement, 11–14

Treaty provisions, 6

stand-alone actions for damages, 5

types, 4

US American model

antitrust provisions, 14–16

deterrence and punishment, 17–21

Green Paper, 21–22

White Paper, 22–23

voluntary redress/compensations, 39–40

Private labels

abuse of buyer power, 290–296

buyer power, 275–277

Competition Law, 273

competition practice, 284

downstream markets, 272, 280–281

economic analysis, 273

empirical research, 272

EU Commission's practice, 285–288

food supply chain, 271

marketing strategy, 273–275

retailers, 275–277

*SCA/Metsa Tissue* case, 289

SSNIP, 288

upstream markets, 272, 277–280

welfare analysis, 281–284

## Q

Quota system

Art. 101 TFEU, 109

Art. 102 TFEU, 109

*Glaxo Greece*

applicability, 111–112

cumulative/alternative, 110–111

ECJ, 112–113

justification, 109

R&D-intensive sectors, 113–114

unilateral limitation of supplies, 108,

109

**R**

Reference Member State (RMS), 478  
 Reverse payment patent settlement agreements (RPSAs)  
   *Actavis*  
 no-authorized-generic Agreements, 484–485  
   size of the payment and rule of reason, 485–486  
   substitutes for litigation, 486–487  
 anticompetitive conducts and regulatory gaming, 472  
 antitrust assessment  
   and IP, 500–501  
   regulatory frameworks, 494–495  
   rule of reason *v.* restriction by object, 495–500  
 antitrust policy, 499  
 brand and the generic manufacturer, 473  
 comparative analysis of practice, US and EU, 494–495  
 earliest case law, 480–481  
 EU regulatory frameworks, 477–479  
*Lundbeck* and Other cases, EU  
   antidepressant drug, 489  
   Arts. 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU, 490, 492, 493  
   competition law perspective, 490  
   co-promotion agreement, 492  
   Court and the Commission, 491  
   detriment of consumers, 491  
   *Fentanyl* case, 491  
   getting-ready-for-generic-entry, 492  
   illegality of generic products, 490  
   problematic issues, 493  
   Servier misused legitimate tools, 492  
*Modafinil* case, 488  
 patent litigation, 473  
 pharmaceutical industry, 472  
 US regulatory frameworks, 474–477

**S**

*SCA/Metsa Tissue* case, 286, 289

Selective distribution agreements, 51–53  
 Sherman Act, 637–668  
 Small but Significant and Non-Transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP), 288, 289, 297  
 Standard essential patent (SEP), 213–215  
 State-owned enterprises (SOEs), China  
   Commission's decision practice  
     coordination risks, 589–590  
     economic unit, 588–589  
     size of the economic unit, 590–591  
   consequences of economic unit doctrine  
     Art. 101 TFEU, 608–610  
     merger control, 605–608  
   decision-making power, 583–584  
   economic unit doctrine, 584  
 EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) (*see* EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), Chinese SOEs)  
 independence of (*see* Independence of Chinese SOEs)  
 jurisdictional notice, 610  
 size of the economic unit  
   *Bluestar/Elkem* decisions, 603  
   *CNCE/KM Group*, 603  
   *DSM/Sinochem*, 603  
   overlapping markets, 604  
   Regional SASACs, 602, 603  
   'worst-case scenario', 602, 604  
 Supplementary protection certificates (SPCs), 479  
 Sustainability-deficit in EU Competition Law  
   agreements, 539  
   Art. 101 (1) TFEU  
     Ancillary Restraints doctrine, 554–555  
     *Cartes Bancaires* case, 554  
     solidarity, 556–558  
     useful effect doctrine, 558–559  
     Wouters doctrine, 555–556  
 assessment, 560  
 Commission's policy choice, 560

descriptive and normative component, 560

developments, The Netherlands

benefits of economization, 544

blood-coals, 542

consumer welfare, 544–545

corporate social responsibility, 543

environmental protection, 542–543

government-supported agreement, 541

initiatives, 543

sectoral agreement, 540

willingness-to-pay survey, ACM, 540–541

Dutch competition authority, 539, 540

governments and private parties, 561

interpretation of Art. 101 (3) TFEU

benefits, 546–549

consumers benefits, 549–551

exception, 545

weighing and balancing, 551–553

regulation, 561

reinterpretation, 559

size, 562

## **T**

Transaction cost theory, 279, 282

## **U**

UK Competition Commission, 291

US Hatch-Waxman Act, 494

## **W**

Wedding rebates, 293, 295