

Subject Index

A

ACCC. *See* Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC)

Access to file, European Commission

antitrust settlement procedures, 303–305

beneficiaries

complainants access, 264–265

objections, statement of, 263–264

right of public access, 265–267

guiding principles

beneficiary rights, 262–263

rights of defence, 260–262

information, use of, 306–307

legal basis and provisions

antitrust proceedings, 256–257

Charter of Fundamental Rights of EU, 256

Decision 2011/695/EU, 258–259

Merger Implementing Regulation, 258

Merger Regulation, 258

notices and practices, 259–260

Regulation 1/2003, 256–257

Regulation 773/2004, 257

methods of provision

confidentiality rings, 292–293

data room procedures, 291–292

electronic storage devices, 290

leniency corporate statement, 290–291

procedure

additional requests, 298–299

judicial review, 299–303

preparation of the accessible, 293–298

scope

Commission's possession,
documents, 281–283

confidential information, 271–278

internal documents, 278–281

investigation file, 267–271

timing

antitrust proceedings, 283–288

merger control proceedings, 288–
289

African competition law regimes

applying Ordoliberalism to

competition law, need for, 431–433

goals of competition law, 433–436

market power and vested interests,
440–444

state policy, consistency of, 436–440

challenges in

goals, 424–425

integrated economic policies, 425–
426

market power and vested interests,
426–428

proliferation of, 422–423

requirement of, 423–424

Anticompetitive parallel conduct under

personalized pricing

collusion, identification of, 380–383

'gap case', search costs, 383–386

concept, 377–380

- price obfuscation, 386–389
- Anticompetitive practices, cartels
 - aversion to price agreements, 344
 - collective boycotts, 344
 - harmful and reprehensible practice, 345
 - respondent categories, 346–347
 - theft/fraud, 345–346
- Antitrust proceedings, access to file
 - statement of objections
 - advisory committee, 288
 - letters of fact, 286–288
 - notification of, 283
 - other parties, 285–286
 - time limit for, 284–285
- Antitrust *Über Alles*, Facebook's data
 - policy
 - Bundeskartellamt's investigation, 360–362
 - GCA and, 355–357
 - interpreting GDPR, 362–366
 - overview, 355–359
 - personal data, 355
 - unfair trading conditions, remedy, 373–374
 - violations, privacy, 366–370
 - Article 102(A) TFEU, 370–373
 - unfair trading conditions, 370–373
- Artificial intelligence (AI), 309–310
- Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), 357–358
- Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM), 193–194
- Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato* (AGCM), 191–193

B

- Bid rigging analysis
 - cases in Serbia, 244–247
 - characteristics of, 239–240
 - definition, 238–239
 - detecting indicators, 246, 247
 - prevention and sanctions, 247–249
 - public procurement, 237–238
 - indicators, 241

- in Serbia, 242–244
- Brazilian experience, quantitative methods
 - and mergers
 - institutional evolution, 537–538
- Nestlé/Garoto merger
 - decision and alignment, 544–545
 - evidence, 543
 - institutional issues, 543–545
 - model types, 541–542
 - sensibility test, 543
 - tools, objectives of, 543
 - view and methodology of, 538–541
- Brexit and competition law, 497–498. *See also* UK competition law regime

C

- Cartel Immunity Programme, 208
- Cartels and competition policy in France
 - education, 353
 - foundations of study
 - empirical and comparative approach, 339
 - public opinion, 337–339
 - rules, social disapproval and law, 336–337
 - methodological study, 340–342
 - comparative approach, 343–344
 - protocol, 342–343
 - overview, 335–336
 - political and media issue, 353
 - survey results and implications
 - anti-competitive practices, 344–347
 - sanctions, 347–352
- Cartels enforcement
 - anti-cartel, 172
 - European literature, 174–177
 - challenges, 175
 - success of appeals, 176–177
 - introduction, 171–174
 - observations, 200–204
 - overview, 171–174
 - rates, nature of annulments and developments

- Belgium, 180–182
- Bulgaria, 182–185
- Croatia, 185–186
- Finland, 186–187
- France, 187–189
- Germany, 189–191
- Italy, 191–193
- Netherlands, 193–195
- Sweden, 196–198
- United Kingdom, 198–200
- rates and methodological considerations, 177–180
- CAT. *See* Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT)
- CCA. *See* Croatian Competition Act (CCA)
- CCPC. *See* Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC)
- CMAs international strategies
 - bilateral relations, 515–518
 - multilateral cooperation, 519–520
 - unilateral enforcement, 509
 - cartel offence, 512–513
 - digitalization, 513–515
 - merger control, 510–512
- Collective action regime, UK
 - CAT certification procedure, 123–125
 - certification cost, 135–137
 - CPO hearings, 128–135
 - development of, 122–123
 - funding, 137
 - Gibson and Merricks* CPO applications, 126–128
 - introduction, 121–122
- Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC), 182
- Common ownership and mergers
 - and innovation competition, 566–568
 - between portfolio companies
 - relevance in practice, 554–555
 - in unilateral effects analysis, 555–557
 - and price effects
 - appropriate metric, 557–559
 - evidentiary standards, 568–572
 - firms pricing incentives, 559–561
 - M-HHI, 565–566
 - pre-merger incentives, 561–564
 - reinforcement, 564–565
- Compensation, damages directive
 - binding effect of national decisions, 226
 - cartel infringements harm, 216
 - consensual settlements, 232–233
 - contributions from infringers, 229
 - disclosure of evidence
 - access to, 216–217
 - assessing proportionality, 222
 - categories of, 223–224
 - ‘closed its proceedings,’ 223
 - foreign competition authority, 221
 - information, 222
 - leniency statements and settlement submissions, 224
 - limits on use of, 225
 - national competition authority, 220–221
 - unauthorized disclosure by CCPC, 221–222
 - indirect purchasers, 232
 - Irish Circuit Court Rules, 217–218
 - joint and several liability, 228
 - of immunity recipients, 229
 - legal professional privilege
 - and disclosure, 218
 - under EU, 219
 - under Irish law, 219
 - member states decisions, 226–227
 - overcharge, 232
 - passing-on defence, 231–232
 - periods, limitation of, 227
 - quantifying harm, 230
 - right to full compensation, 216
 - SMEs, liability of, 228
 - third party funding, 233
- Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC), 208

Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), 198
 Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), 199–200
 Competition in digital economy, 314–315
 CPC. *See* Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC)
 Croatian Competition Act (CCA), 185–186
 Croatian Competition Agency, *Agencija za zastitu trzisnog natjecanja* (AZTN), 185–186

D

Damages directive, Irish system
 actions
 civil proceedings, 210
 claims, 209
 competition list, 210
 criminal law proceedings, 211
 Donovan and others v. Electricity Supply Board, 212
 ECN+ and civil fines, 211
 follow-on actions, 212
 infringement of, 211–212
 Island Ferries Teoranta v. Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, Ireland and others (2011), 212–213
 trucks cartel, 213
 commission initiatives, 233–235
 defined, 205
 EU competition law, 206–209
 actions, 208
 effectiveness and equivalence of, 208–209
 on-going difficulties, 207–208
 private and public enforcement, 208
 implementation by regulations, 213–233
 changes by, 216–218
 compensation right, 216

competition authority, 220–225
 competition law, changes in, 213
 contributions, 229
 difficulties in, 215–216
 harm in actions, 230
 legal professional privilege, 218–219
 liabilities, 228–229
 national decisions, 226
 passing-on rules, 231
 rebuttable presumption, 216
 Statute of Limitations, 227

Digital economy. *See* Digital polyopolies

Digital polyopolies

algorithms in, 315–317
 and application of competition law, 325–329
 collusions, 316
 competition in, 314–315
 liability, 329–332
 oligopolies and
 and concerted practice, 318–322
 polyopoly concept, 322–325
 overview, 309–313

Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), 208

Donovan and others v. Electricity Supply Board, 212

DPP. *See* Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP)

E

Economic constitution

(*Wirtschaftsverfassung*), 429

Emerging trend in Southeast Asia

comparable competition laws, 587–588
 goals of competition law, 588–591
 institutional design, 597–601
 overview, 577–579
 political economy, 580–582
 preconditions for, 579–580
 substantive design, 591–592
 abuse of dominant position, 592–593

- anticompetitive agreements, 593–595
- control of concentration, 595–597
- in Thailand and Myanmar
 - economic context of, 585–587
 - political context of, 582–585
- EU antitrust law, defined, 21
- EU competition law
 - competition authorities' task, 158
 - de facto* independence and limitations, 165–166
 - enforcement, 149–151
 - European Commission's role and competition authorities, 163–165
 - independence
 - from economic operators and business interests, 159–161
 - from government, other state bodies and politics, 161–163
 - notion of, 155–157
 - independence of competition
 - authorities of EU Member States
 - ECN+ Directive, 153–155
 - provisions on independence, 151–152
 - prioritization and independence, 166–169
 - role of judicial review, 165
- EU law for competition damages actions
 - Charter, 206–207
 - claims, 208
 - difficulties in, 207
 - in domestic law, 208–209
 - private and public enforcement, 208
- F**
 - Facebook's data policy. *See* Antitrust *Über Alles*, Facebook's data policy
 - Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (FCCA), 186–187
 - Framing algorithms, competition law
 - development of, 410–417
 - company transparency duties, 416
 - customer information rights, 416
 - factual and analytical foundation, 410
 - pro-competitiveness, 412
 - results-based approach, 415
 - issues in
 - collusion, 403–407
 - Google shopping, 408–410
 - resale price maintenance, 401–402
 - legal toolbox
 - financial markets and data protection rules, 392–395
 - regulatory tools and categories, 395–400
- Freiburg School. *See* Ordoliberalism
- G**
 - General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 356
 - German Competition Act (GWB), 356
 - German Competition Authority (GCA), 355–357
- H**
 - Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index(HHI), 530, 554, 557
- I**
 - Intellectual property rights (IP rights)
 - competition law and, 451–453
 - goals of, 460–464
 - non-utilitarian theories, 460–464
 - patent assertion entities (PAEs), 464–467
 - utilitarian theories, 460–464
 - goals of competition rules, 467–473
 - interface, 453–459
 - TRIPS agreement on, 453
 - Interdependency, oligopoly, 312
 - Interim judicial protection
 - car glass cartel, 58–61
 - early case law, 52–53
 - hydrogen peroxide cartel, 53–57
 - lessons from case law, 62–65

- need for interim relief, 51–52
- power cables cartel, 61–62
- publishing antitrust decisions, 45–48
 - opposition to, 48–51
- Investigation file
 - extent of, 267–268
 - merger control proceedings, 270–271
 - statement of objections, 268–270
- Irish law for collective redress, 233–234
 - at EU level, 234–235
- Irish system and damages directive, 209–213
 - civil proceedings, 210
 - competition list, 210
 - criminal law proceedings, 211
 - Donovan and others v. Electricity Supply Board*, 212
 - ECN+ and civil fines, 211
 - follow-on actions, 212
 - infringement of, 211–212
 - Island Ferries Teoranta v. Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, Ireland and others (2011)*, 212–213
 - trucks cartel, 213
- Island Ferries Teoranta v. Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, Ireland and others*, 212–213
- Italian Competition Authority (ICA), 358

L

- Law on Protection of Competition of 2008 (LPC), 182
- Legal professional privilege (LPP)
 - cumulative conditions for lawyer–client communication
 - AM & S Europe v. Commission* case, 24–26
 - for client's rights of defence, 24–25
 - exclusion of in-house lawyers, 26–31
 - exclusion of non-EEA lawyers, 31–32
 - Peridopril (Servier)* case, 25

- defined, 22–23
- EU antitrust law enforcement
 - private enforcement, 40–41
 - public enforcement, 38–40
- internal documents, 32–33
- legal nature, legal basis and rationale, 23–24
- procedure and practice
 - hearing officer's role, 37–38
 - inspections, 33–35
 - requests for information, 36
- Legal toolbox, competition law algorithms
 - financial markets data protection law, 392–395
 - regulatory tools and categories
 - ex post intervention, 400
 - prevention and deterrence, 397–400
 - transparency and documentation, 395–397
- Liability, digital polyopoly, 329–322

M

- Modified HHI (M-HHI), 557–558
- 'More economic' approach to antitrust
 - baselessness of second mantra
 - limitations of, 491–495
 - objectives of, 489–491
- competition law, 476–480
- economic effects, 477–478
- failure of first mantra, 480–483
- enforcement tools, 487–489
 - limitations of, 483–487
- guiding principles, 476
- Myanmar competition law goal, 588–590

N

- National competition authorities (NCAs), 171
- Non-accessible documents
 - confidential information
 - notion of, 271–277
 - evidentiary value, 277–278
 - internal documents, 278–281

Non bis in idem principle
 application criteria, 80–81
 application in EU law
 abolishing the condition of the unity
 of the legal interest, 86
 Article 52(1) of the Charter in
 competition law, 82–83
 coordinating mechanisms, 84–85
 legal basis for dual proceedings, 84
 approach under EU competition law
 accounting principle, 74–76
 identity of facts, 71–74
 unity of the legal interest, 70–71
 unity of the legal offender, 69–70
 Article 50 of the Charter
 Garlsson Real Estate case, 77–78
 Menci case, 77
 Article 52(1) of the Charter, application
 of, 78–79
 ECtHR
 A and B V. NORWAY, 79–80
 introduction, 67–69

O

Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (OLG), 189–191
 OECD. *See* Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
 Oligopolies, digital, 311–312
 algorithms and application of
 competition law to, 325–329
 digital polyopoly, concept of, 322–325
 practices, 318–322
 Ordoliberalism. *See also* African competition law regimes
 applying to African competition law regimes
 goals of, 433–436
 market power and vested interests, 440–444
 need for, 431–433

 state policy, consistency of, 436–440
 criticisms of, 429–431
 elements of, 428–429
 fundamental orders, 429
 growth and welfare, 419
 overview, 419–422
 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 311

P

Parallel conduct, 311
 Patent assertion entities (PAEs), 464–467
 PPIs. *See* Pricing pressure indices (PPIs)
 Pricing pressure indices (PPIs), 558–559
 Private sector transaction economy
 (*Verkehrswirtschaft*), 429
 Procedure for accessible of file
 in antitrust settlement, 303–305
 Article 8 of Decision 2011/695/EU, 295–297
 index of file, 297–298
 preparation of
 confidentiality discussions, 294
 onus on information providers, 293–294
 Public and private cartel enforcement
 conjoint analysis
 approaching respondents, 99
 competition lawyers, 108–111
 firms, 99–108
 direct questions
 competition lawyers, 116–118
 firms, 112–116
 hypothesis, 91–93
 introduction, 87–90, 118–120
 leniency programme, 90–93
 method, 93
 model
 conjoint analysis, 93–94
 design of conjoint choice sets, 97–99
 nested logit model, 96–97

- nested structure of choices, 94–96
- Public Procurement Law in Serbia, 242–244
- Public sector centrally administered economy (*Zentralverwaltungswirtschaft*), 429

Q

- Quantitative methods and mergers
 - Brazilian experience
 - institutional evolution, 537–538
 - Nestlé/Garoto merger, 538–545
 - competitive models, 526–532
 - employment and competition techniques
 - admissibility and credibility of, 533–536
 - systemic view of, 532–533
 - overview, 523–526
 - quantitative tools, 526–532

S

- SAC. *See* Supreme Administrative Court (SAC)
- Sanctions and competition policy in
 - France, cartels
 - finances, 347–348
 - French Competition Authority, 351–352
 - on individuals, 348–349
 - leniency policy, 349–351
- Supreme Administrative Court (SAC), 183
- Swedish Competition Authority
 - Konkurrensverket* (KKV), 196–198

T

- Thailand competition law goal, 590–591
- Third-party tracking
 - exploitation
 - excessive data collection, 14–16
 - quality degradation, 13–14
 - market power and merger control, 8–12
 - prevalence, 6–8
 - significance/implications, 5–6, 16–19
- Trade and Industry Appeal Tribunal (TIAT), 194–195
- TRIPS agreement (agreement on Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), 453

U

- UK competition law regime
 - Brexit, trade policy of, 500–503
 - international orientation of, 498–500
 - international strategies, CMAs, 507–508
 - bilateral relations, 515–518
 - multilateral cooperation, 519–520
 - unilateral enforcement, 509–515
 - overview, 497–498
 - uniqueness of, 503
 - development of, 504–505
 - partial alignment with EU, 506–507
- UK merger control regime, 510–512
- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 438

W

- Willingness to pay (WTP), 377–380