The
wave of reforming corporate governance has been increasingly, strong worldwide
since the devastating 2008 financial, crisis. The existing theories by
corporate lawyers have offered, two distinct paths for the reform. The
convergence theory argues, that with the force of competition, commercial
jurisdictions in the, globe will automatically converge towards a single
optimal model, of corporate governance sooner or later that is featured with
the, shareholder-oriented principle. On the contrary, the divergence, theory
insists that the effect of path dependence, especially the, idiosyncratic
political traditions or influences, is the key dynamic, force to push the
evolution of corporate governance in a certain, commercial jurisdiction. With
the proofs of Chinese state-controlled, listed companies (SCLCs), it is
demonstrated that the, divergence theory is more convincing and pragmatic. One
of the, most important implications of this understanding is that the, improvement
of the corporate governance of the SCLCs relies on, the Chinese political
reform to a large degree.