Byreadingthe B2C partofthe Common European Sales Law (CESL) as a supplyof optional standardizedcontracts, thisarticletriestogivetheCommission'sproposalthebestpossible rationale. In contrasttoconventionalcontractcodescharacterizedbyloosebundlesofdefaultrulesthepartiesmayselectively stick toordivergefrom, an optional standardizedcontractis a tightbundleofdefaultruleswith a nameattachedto it. As optional standardizedcontractsaresimplyidentifiablebytheirlabel, theycantheoreticallysolvetheproblemofreadingcostsandthusavoidadverseselection. This ideahelpstomake sense ofthe rigid internalstructureofthe CESL thatgenerallyexcludescherry-picking. Fromthisperspective, itis also unobjectionableforthe CESL toaimat an upscalesegmentofconsumersbyoffering a high levelofprotection (leadingtocorrespondingly high prices). However, welfare-increasingeffectscanonlybeexpectedif Member States, third States and private organizationsareallowedtojointhecompetitionbyprovidingotherstandardizedcontracts. As theregulatoryframeworkcreatedbythe EU (choice-of-lawrestrictionforconsumercontractsandsubstantiveharmonizationof Member State laws) ties down all potential competitors, theseeffectswill not materialize. This leadstotheconclusionthattheCommissionis not seriouslypursuingtheideaof an optional law, but ultimatelymeanstopre-empt Member States' lawswithitsproposal.
Common Market Law Review