This article critically examines the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change (ESABCC) as an ambitious experiment in both EU climate governance and regulatory science. It asserts that the Board holds considerable potential to enhance the scientific rationality of the EU’s climate policy, through its science-based yet policy-oriented advisory mandate. However, shortcomings at both its operational and institutional design levels risk eroding the foundations of its scientific legitimacy and effectiveness. Operationally, the ESABCC’s opaque conflicts of interest management and broader lack of transparency undermine its credibility. At design level, its covert embedment within the European Environment Agency (EEA) weakens its independence and exceeds the Agency’s original mandate. This article proposes changes to both the ESABCC’s practice and the EEA’s founding Regulation, with a view to realigning the functioning of both bodies with the principles of regulatory science and the objectives of the European Climate Law.
Common Market Law Review