Following China’s 2024 Judicial Interpretation on Civil Antitrust Litigation, the article examines how private enforcement of competition law has developed in China and the European Union. Both systems rest on the two modes of contract and tort, although the balance and mechanisms differ. In China, the nullity of agreements reflects the interaction between public and private law. Yet this contract-based approach primarily functions as a sanction and provides limited direct remedies for consumers. In the EU, Article 101(2) TFEU renders anti-competitive agreements void, while the tort model, reinforced by the Damages Directive, enables claims for damages. However, these actions are costly, impose stringent evidentiary burdens, and are often ineffective in addressing harms like deadweight loss.
From a consumer perspective, both frameworks therefore fall short. Collective redress mechanisms have emerged as partial remedies, but the expansion of opt-out models continues to encounter institutional and procedural constraints. This paper contributes by placing China’s recent practice in dialogue with EU law and by urging a recalibration of private enforcement through a consumer-oriented perspective. It advocates closer scrutiny of derivative “fruit” agreements within the contractual framework and the exploration of public compensation tools within the tort framework, with the objective of enhancing the effective consumer protection.