This article addresses the tension between the need to regulate takeovers activity through the chain principle, as to ensure minority shareholders protection and equal treatment of shareholders, and the adverse effects that may arise from that regulation. An explanation of how the chain principle is regulated in the United Kingdom and difficulties in applying the chain principle rules, particularly, to ascertain the chain price. Different possibilities Germany is offered and the Sky bid is presented as an example of the practical of how the chain principle could be designed are considered, namely regarding the most suitable method to ascertain the chain price and the most adequate entity to do it. The article ultimately concludes that the chain principle is a regulatory need because the mandatory bid rule could not be successfully achieved without the chain principle and that there is no perfect solution to find an equilibrium between the need to regulate the chain principle and its adverse effects, as rules enhancing the probability of an offer being made may have a negative impact on the premium value; while rules enhancing the premium value may have a negative impact on the probability of an offer being made.