The article argues that rules related to infrastructure exemption policy and rules on competition prescribed in the primary legislation share similar characteristics, but both are, nevertheless, applied in different scenarios. It is arguable that the Commission acts ultra vires in both legal frameworks. Although, the CJEU also has an opportunity to decide upon the application of refusal to deal and the respective essential facilities doctrine, it has, nonetheless, not chosen to follow the path of the Commission. Overall, the article encourages penetration of Art. 102(b) TFEU into the sectorial legislation, which then would be a suitable mix of two legal disciplines. Such a mixed legal instrument then would qualify as a solution for boosting up innovation. On the other hand, perhaps the remedy then should be rather sought in the realm of competences and the respective international agreements.
While the EU internal natural gas market is subject to the liberalization processes, investing entities might be ``locked-up'' concerning their decisional abilities as legislation overly tries to ensure an equal level playing field for every investor. Therefore, one of the possibilities is to challenge the troublesome EU law measure under the WTO. Entities transporting the commodity hold the highest share of incentives to expand, develop and operate on the market. It has to be understood that the Union itself cannot construct the necessary infrastructure in order to satisfy the ever- growing consumer demand for natural gas. Article emphasizes that the EU energy acquis should not extend outside the internal market otherwise acquis would fail.European Energy and Environmental Law Review