The efforts invested by the EU to assist the resolution of the disputes over the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are long-standing and multifaceted. Yet, a dissonance exists between the EU’s strong interest in the resolution of these conflicts, its firm commitment and its long-standing engagement to promoting such resolution, and its actual, ineffective contribution to achieving that goal. Drawing on scholarship that analyses the factors that erode the effectiveness of the EU’s contribution to conflict resolution in Georgia, this article seeks to identify and analyse various strategies and considerations that could render the EU’s conflict resolution efforts more effective. These strategies and considerations will be classified into those pertaining to Georgia’s political establishment, Georgia’s civil society, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Russia, and will be linked to two broader themes, namely EU enlargement and the EU’s commitment to strict observance of international law. The analysis conducted in this article including its conclusions relies upon literature on comparative conflict resolution.
European Foreign Affairs Review