This article argues that the CJEU’s recent jurisprudence on the
principle of autonomy has been carefully crafted to lend support to the
European Commission’s efforts to establish a Multilateral Investment Court. The
CJEU has historically approached international courts and tribunals with
caution. However, the Multilateral Investment Court is unlike other such
bodies, because it is designed to supplant existing models of investment
arbitration which the CJEU disdains. Moreover, certain features of the
Multilateral Investment Court would be likely to make it especially attractive
to the CJEU – namely its probable applicable law, judicial structure, and the
control the CJEU could exert upon it. The surprising and sudden shift in tone
between the CJEU’s recent decisions in Achmea and Opinion 1/17
becomes readily explicable when the two cases are viewed in light of the
proposed Multilateral Investment Court. On analysis, the CJEU’s apparent
support for the Multilateral Investment Court is best understood as the logical
continuation of its longstanding jurisprudence on the principle of autonomy.