This article examines the legal function of the principle of energy solidarity under Article 194 TFEU and its role in structuring decision-making within European Union (EU) energy law. It asks whether energy solidarity operates as a binding constitutional principle capable of constraining institutional discretion, or whether it remains primarily procedural in nature. The analysis is based on a doctrinal examination of primary and secondary EU law, combined with a systematic review of the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), including the landmark Ostseepipeline-Anbindungsleitung (OPAL) judgment and subsequent jurisprudence.
The article argues that energy solidarity has evolved into a justiciable legal standard requiring EU institutions to identify, assess and balance the effects of measures. While formally procedural, this obligation produces substantive outcomes by rendering decisions unlawful where important interests related to energy security are disregarded. The study further situates this development within the broader tensions of EU energy policy, particularly the need to reconcile security of supply, sustainability and affordability in times of structural transformation and crisis.
By analysing the interaction between Article 194 TFEU and crisis-based legal instruments, notably Article 122 TFEU, the article demonstrates that energy solidarity functions as a constitutional mechanism for managing interdependence in an integrated energy market. It concludes that solidarity does not eliminate conflict, but provides a legal framework for navigating it.
European Public Law