Abstract. Up to the present time, the European Court of Human Rights has handed down 18 interesting judgments on Article 1 of Additional Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. As interpreted by the Court, this provision authorises three types of restrictions to the right to property which it lays down, but in contrast to the other provisions which permit restrictions (in particular Articles 8–11 of the Convention) it makes no mention of what is necessary in a democratic society. What is proposed here is a global reading of the case law of the Court in this field in order to demonstrate the logic lying behind the system of control set up by the Court, which is essentially based on the notion of porportionality, with the Court determining the correct balance to be set between considerations of the public interest, as put forward by the States, which might justify interferences (the purpose and utility of the restriction with recognition of a sphere of discretion for the State), and the rights of the individual (the right to property, and also the other rights guaranteed under the system of the Convention). Certain general principles are emerging which make it possible to evaluate the influence of the case law of the Court on the right to property. Although the number of violations which the Court has found appears to be very small, it is significant that those which it has found are essentially based on the failure to respect other rights under the Convention which restrictions upon the right to property affect indirectly, and the reference to the notion of necessity in a democratic society introduced by the Court has tended rather to increase the scope of discretion accorded to the States with regard to the general interest, instead of limiting it which is the case in relation to the other rights which are guaranteed with the exception of restrictions which are necessary in a democratic society.
European Review of Private Law