Abstract. Responsibility of the state for faults committed in the course of the administration of justice. Principle and conditions of application. 1. Consequences resulting from the personal exemption enjoyed by the institutions of the state, in particular judges and officials of the ministere public. 2. Consequences resulting from the judicial nature of the act which causes loss and of the principle of res judicata. 1. The responsibility of the state is not necessarily excluded by the fact that the institution itself may not be liable for the act which causes loss even though it may have issued the act, either because the institution cannot be identified, or because the act cannot be regarded as a fault on the part of the institution (. . .), or because this act is a fault but the institution itself is personally exempted from liability. The state may, in general, be regarded as responsible for the loss resulting from a fault committed by a judge or an official of the ministere public where such a person has acted within the limits of his or her statutory powers, or would reasonably be regarded as having acted within these limits. 2. The principles of the separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary as well as the principle of res judicata do not imply that in general terms the state is protected from the obligation to make good the damage caused to another by its fault or by the fault of its institutions in the course of the administration of justice, in particular in the course of the performance of those acts which directly constitute the object of the judicial function. However, if the fault committed by a judge or by an official of the ministere public constitutes the direct object of the judicial function, the claim for compensation of loss cannot, in general, be accepted unless the act in question has, on the grounds of violation of an established legal principle, been removed, amended, annulled or withdrawn by a decision which itself has the authority of res judicata and the original act does not itself now have the authority of res judicata.
European Review of Private Law