This article examines the current crisis of multilateralism amid escalating geopolitical tensions, technological disruption, and the fragmentation of global governance, with a particular focus on the World Trade Organization (WTO). It argues that the paralysis of the WTO Appellate Body (AB) represents not merely an institutional malfunction but a systemic shift away from rule-based multilateralism toward power-based and fragmented arrangements. The analysis situates this development within a broader transformation of the international order characterized by flexible alliances, increased reliance on plurilateral agreements, and diminishing consensus-based decision-making. It further underscores the growing importance of political risk assessment in strategic decision-making as global rules lose enforceability. Drawing on recent examples – including Peru-s experience in the WTO’s fisheries subsidies and e-commerce negotiations – the article concludes that restoring effective multilateralism requires institutional adaptation, flexible negotiation frameworks, searching alternatives to consensus and renewed political commitment.
Global Trade and Customs Journal