Self-Flagellation: U.S. Antidumping and the National Export Initiative - Global Trade and Customs Journal View Self-Flagellation: U.S. Antidumping and the National Export Initiative by - Global Trade and Customs Journal Self-Flagellation: U.S. Antidumping and the National Export Initiative 6 6

Four out of every five U.S. antidumping measures restrict imports of raw materials and other industrial inputs consumed by downstream U.S. producers in their own production processes. Yet the statute forbids the administering authorities from considering the impact of prospective antidumping restrictions on the well-being of those downstream, consuming industries or on the economy at large. But such restrictions invariably raise the costs of production for those downstream firms, weakening their capacity to compete with foreign producers in the United States and abroad.

The National Export Initiative should include a serious commitment to antidumping reform. At a minimum, that reform should include provisions to ensure that consuming industries be given legal standing to participate fully and meaningfully in antidumping proceedings; that antidumping measures be rejected if the projected costs of those restriction on those firms and on the broader economy exceed some reasonable threshold; and, that any duties applied not exceed the level found necessary to remedy injury to the petitioning domestic industry.

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