This study examines participation constraints faced by developing countries and the impact of wealth and power (the power hypothesis) or economic and legal capacity (the capacity hypothesis) of a Member State on its decision to file a legal complaint against a specific other member at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Empirical research of 486 WTO disputes filed between 1995 and 2014 indicates that legal capacity matters more than power considerations in the WTO members’ legal dispute settlements. This study is based on the premise that Kazakhstan does best when using the WTO dispute settlement system (after its accession to the WTO) against its main trading partners. Moreover, it attempts to predict the maximum gross domestic product (GDP) levels of Kazakhstan’s potential defendants. The main findings are that under the legal capacity theory, Kazakhstan’s economic features (such as GDP per capita, international trade position, government efficiency, military and non-military government spending, and others) are sufficient to proceed with legal claims against the Netherlands, Austria, Romania, Portugal, and Belarus.
Journal of World Trade