The paralysis of the Appellate Body (AB) has turned ‘appeal into the void’ into a central fault line of the WTO dispute settlement system. This article characterizes this practice as counternormative: formally compliant with the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) yet undermining the system’s capacity to deliver enforceable rulings. Doctrinally, the article reconstructs two competing interpretations of DSU Articles 3, 16.4, and 17: one viewing a notice of appeal as sufficient to block the adoption of Panel reports; the other treating effective appellate review as a prerequisite for any blocking effect. This split is traced to the tension between contractualism and constitutionalism, and their differing prioritization of input versus output legitimacy. Using a Kantian antinomy framework, the article maps these opposing logics and analyses recent safeguard and anti-dumping disputes. It concludes that because the WTO rests on state consent while striving for a rule-based order, appeal into the void cannot be resolved by technical fixes alone; reform entails redistributing burdens between competing normative commitments.
Journal of World Trade