Delegation of Rulemaking Power to European Standards Organizations: Reconsidered - Legal Issues of Economic Integration View Delegation of Rulemaking Power to European Standards Organizations: Reconsidered by - Legal Issues of Economic Integration Delegation of Rulemaking Power to European Standards Organizations: Reconsidered 44 4

The concerns about the legality of delegation of rule-making power to standards bodies have long been raised in academic circles. The common ground of criticism is based on the Meroni doctrine, and the view that co-regulation via standardization falls short of Meroni requirements, particularly, is not restrained with administrative and judicial control.

The present submission reconsiders the delegation debate in light of the recent developments at the legislative level, i.e. adoption of Regulation 1025/2012, and in case law, namely the ESMA and James Elliott cases. It argues that the current changes leave room for viewing delegation to European standards bodies as lawful if constrained by a judicial review. In turn, the James Elliott case creates an opportunity to establish the CJEU’s jurisdiction over harmonized European standards and to ensure legal accountability.

Legal Issues of Economic Integration