In the Google Saga, the General Court (GC) has confirmed the Commission’s decisions in Google Shopping and Google Android and dealt a severe blow to Google’s strategy, which was aimed at strengthening its market power throughout its ecosystem. Although in both cases, Google was essentially favouring its own services in adjacent markets to the detriment of competitors, the Commission and the GC based their decisions on different theories of harm. In Google Shopping, the GC considered Google’s conduct abusive pursuant to a novel category of abuse prohibiting self-preferencing conduct. In Google Android, instead, Google was held to have engaged in abusive forms of tying. Interestingly, in both cases Google’s conduct resembles instances of constructive refusal to give access to an input, which require evidence that the input is indispensable in order to be considered abusive. However, the Commission managed to circumvent the application of the high threshold posed by the indispensability criterion. This might have the effect of inappropriately lowering the standard of proof in cases of refusal to access, paving the way for an over-enforcement of competition rules in digital markets. This article is aimed at evaluating the potential impact that the Google judgments may have on the scope of application of the indispensability requirement, and whether there is still life for the latter after the Google Saga.