Réputation de l’arbitre et décision arbitrale : quelques éléments d’analyse économique - Revue de l’arbitrage View Réputation de l’arbitre et décision arbitrale : quelques éléments d’analyse économique by - Revue de l’arbitrage Réputation de l’arbitre et décision arbitrale : quelques éléments d’analyse économique 2012 4

Arbitration has been the subject of various works on the economics of law, which occasionally neglect the active role of arbitrators as legal suppliers and producers of decisions. This article elaborates an economic conception of the arbitrators’ behaviour, perceived as a rational economic agent, and examines the consequences on the arbitral decision. The first part of the article examines the individual objectives of the arbitrator by reference to the traditional assumptions of an economic analysis of the law. The second part introduces the arbitrator’s interest in his individual reputation, and examines certain effects thereof on the arbitral decision. Finally, the third part considers the relationship between the reputation of the arbitrator, the publication of awards and the transparency of decisions. The author concludes that an economic analysis of the law enables one to acknowledge the co-existence of different styles of arbitration and arbitrators’ personalities. In an a priori paradoxical manner, the personal interest of the arbitrators may also explain a certain quality of arbitral decisions.

Revue de l’arbitrage