Le droit applicable à l’autorité de la chose jugée dans l’arbitrage - Revue de l’arbitrage View Le droit applicable à l’autorité de la chose jugée dans l’arbitrage by - Revue de l’arbitrage Le droit applicable à l’autorité de la chose jugée dans l’arbitrage 2016 1

The issue of the law applicable to the res judicata principle in international arbitration carries an important practical weight given the discrepancies, found in comparative law, surrounding the res judicata principle itself. Yet, if the question is important, its answer appears, for several reasons, rather difficult to find. Firstly, the doubts surrounding the notion of res judicata itself are not making the task at hand easy. Secondly, the issue of res judicata in arbitration is, in fact, a topic that can be approached from different angles since it may concern different decisions (arbitral awards, domestic courts’ decisions on the merits of a dispute, domestic courts’ decisions on arbitral proceedings) and different authorities (arbitrators, domestic judges hearing the merits of the dispute, the supporting judge (“juge d’appui” the judge controlling the award). This article is however limited to the issue of the law applicable to the res judicata principle from the arbitrator’s point of view, when the latter faces an award or a judgment on the merits rendered in another proceedings whose res judicata is invoked before him. Regarding this issue, the “conflictualist approach” is not the most helpful. On top of the “usual” difficulties faced in private international law when determining the law applicable to the res judicata principle—which are already important when assessing the res judicata of a court’s decision in another domestic proceedings, and are reaching even more complexity in arbitration — we can add the relatively disappointing content of the law eventually elected to deal with the issues triggered by the res judicata principle in the specific context of international arbitration. However, the substantive rules method (“méthode des règles matérielles”) which could appear more appropriate, given the advantages supposedly granted to it by many scholars, is also disappointing, at least given the current state of law. In the end, a lot needs to be done in order to make things clearer. Notwithstanding the latter, a few proposals can be made in that respect.

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