This article is inspired by the recent criminalization of cartels in Greece and its initial hypothesis is that this reform will probably not work well in practice. It questions the necessity and potential effectiveness of the reform from a historical, policy, and practical perspective. The historical analysis addresses the enforcement regime prior to the recent amendment and its impact upon business expectations in light of the deterrence theory. The policy analysis is based on a pilot empirical project examining the prevailing moral perception among Greek consumers towards cartels. Finally, the practical level analysis examines, first, the potential problems in the coordination between the current administrative proceedings and the newly introduced custodial sanctions and, second, potential adverse impact of the recent criminalization on the Greek Leniency Programme. This three-level analysis reveals that the 'criminalization ideal' is not in line with the Greek legal system. Most importantly, since choices at national level influence policy changes at European level, any future European initiative in the field should be very cautious and not misguided by hasty national developments.
World Competition