This paper considers the implications of the preliminary ruling in the case of Competition Authority v. Beef Industry Development Society and Barry Brothers Meats for the legal standards applicable to restrictions of competition 'by object' and analyse its wider impact on the interpretation of Article 101 TFEU (formerly Article 81 EC Treaty). Its first part will examine whether this preliminary ruling is consistent with the existing principles governing the application of Article 101(1) EU Treaty to 'restructuring deals'. The second will briefly consider the principles governing the application of section 1 of the US Sherman Act and in the light of this examination will try to gauge the wider ramifications of Barry Brothers for the interpretation of Article 101 TFEU. It will be argued that the Court of Justice of the EU, responsive to the call for a 'modernized' interpretation of this provision, applied some of the elements characterizing the more flexible and 'economics-principled' approach hitherto relevant for 'by effect' cases to the assessment of a prima facie restrictions by object. The paper will conclude that the Court of Justice, in a manner which displays some similarities with the US Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1 of the US Sherman Act, seems now to adopt an interpretation of the prohibition clause inspired more by an idea of 'continuum' between more and less serious infringements than by a relatively stark alternative between 'by object' and 'by effect' restrictions of competition.
World Competition