This article analyses the challenges faced by the National Competition Authorities (NCAs) of the emerging economies in imposing structural remedies on the notified concentrations that generate anticompetitive effects. Contrary to what is usually argued in the literature, this article argues that the NCAs of the emerging economies usually 'under-enforce' their system of merger control, by imposing behavioural rather than structural remedies. This is due to the widespread practice of gun jumping and due to the need not to disincentive foreign investors. This article relies on a case study on Brazil and Argentina as examples of emerging economies that have been enforcing a system of merger control for more than a decade in order to elaborate policy conclusions applicable to other emerging economies. In particular, this article argues that the NCAs of the emerging economies could enforce more effectively their system of merger control if an ex ante system of notification that sanctions the practice of gun jumping is introduced, together with a clear time frame of merger review that the NCA has to comply with.
World Competition