Self-preferencing is often described as a ubiquitous feature of digital markets. The emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) services is expected to further intensify attention and concerns regarding the strategies that large online platforms may adopt to grant preferential treatment to their own products and services. As a result, policymakers and competition authorities worldwide have embarked on a hunt for this perceived new menace, launching an ever-growing array of regulatory measures and antitrust probes. Yet, at this stage, no one has been able to draw a clear profile of the wanted, as a wide range of distinct practices seem to fit the description. Like a perfect Zelig, self-preferencing appears everywhere because it resembles everything. Against this background, the paper argues that the significance of self-preferencing has been largely overstated. First, self-preferencing does not exist as a distinct legal or economic concept: it is merely a catch-all label describing a mild form of vertical integration that encompasses a variety of practices already addressed under existing competition law provisions. Second, the notion is far from novel as similar conduct and strategies have long been standard practice among traditional brick-and-mortar retailers. Finally, the economic literature provides evidence that such practices are not necessarily detrimental to consumer welfare, suggesting that blanket prohibitions would be unjustified.
World Competition