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Chiara Zilioli, Michael Ioannidis
Common Market Law Review
Volume 59, Issue 2 (2022) pp. 363 – 394
https://doi.org/10.54648/cola2022029
Abstract
The ECB’s mandate regarding climate change is being actively debated. According to some, the ECB’s mandate excludes any climate-related role, while others argue for a broad responsibility of the ECB in this context. This article argues for a middle way: under certain conditions, the ECB should take climate change into account and act accordingly while pursuing its objectives. EU law and the overall constitutional structure of the Union also provide limits as to how much the ECB can do in this field. This article focuses on the interpretation of the secondary objective of the ECB, according to which the ECB shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the Union’s objectives. This argues that this objective might lend support to ECB measures with an environmental dimension, but it only establishes a contributory power: the ECB cannot make its own environmental policies.
Keywords
ECB, central banking, mandate, monetary policy, climate change, institutional balance
Extract
The ECB’s mandate regarding climate change is being actively debated. According to some, the ECB’s mandate excludes any climate-related role, while others argue for a broad responsibility of the ECB in this context. This article argues for a middle way: under certain conditions, the ECB should take climate change into account and act accordingly while pursuing its objectives. EU law and the overall constitutional structure of the Union also provide limits as to how much the ECB can do in this field. This article focuses on the interpretation of the secondary objective of the ECB, according to which the ECB shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the Union’s objectives. This argues that this objective might lend support to ECB measures with an environmental dimension, but it only establishes a contributory power: the ECB cannot make its own environmental policies.