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Giles Scott-Smith
European Foreign Affairs Review
Volume 24, Special Issue (2019) pp. 21 – 41
https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2019017
Abstract
This article considers the cultural relationship in the transatlantic space from the perspective of US cultural diplomacy. It interprets cultural diplomacy as the mobilization of soft power resources in the support of foreign policy goals, as distinct from the cultural relations pursued by non-state actors. During the second half of the twentieth century, a large-scale investment by US cultural diplomacy was aimed at developing and nurturing the cultural ties with Europe, as part of the wider integration of (Western, later also Eastern) Europe into a US-led world order. This involved combining the unique outreach possibilities provided by the appeal and excellence of US cultural producers with an anti-communist agenda that sought to reverse the negative perception of the United States as culturally ‘barren’. This effort declined following the end of the Cold War, since it was no longer considered important. The shock of 9/11 once again directed attention to how the US portrays itself abroad, reviving interest in cultural diplomacy and generating a wide range of programmes to (re-)engage with European publics, particularly minorities. The article begins by introducing the concept of cultural diplomacy, and examining its uses during the Cold War. It then evaluates the specific cultural tools that have been used to establish transatlantic connections in the wake of 9/11. It concludes by considering the growing significance of the ‘transnational transatlantic’ for developing goal-driven ties between the US and Europe across a range of issues.
Extract
We investigate whether the bank crisis management framework of the European banking union can effectively bar the detrimental influence of national interests in cross-border bank failures. We find that both the internal governance structure and decision-making procedure of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the interplay between the SRB and national resolution authorities in the implementation of supranationally devised resolution schemes provide inroads that allow opposing national interests to obstruct supranational resolution. The amendments to the framework recently proposed by the European Commission would not alter the assessment materially. We also show that the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), even after the ratification of the reform of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the introduction of the SRF backstop facility, is inapt to overcome these frictions. We propose a full supranationalization of resolution decision-making. This would allow European authorities in charge of bank crisis management to operate autonomously and achieve socially optimal outcomes beyond national borders.