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The government controlling shareholder wields significant and substantial powers over state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which play a critical economic and social role in many jurisdictions. As the government, it should act in the public interest and not for any partisan ends. However, although the government controller can and has abused its powers and engaged in conflicts of interest, it is not subject to any specific constraints or duties under corporate law. I advance a new theory of fiduciary government controlling shareholder that can provide a theoretical and legal basis to evaluate the conduct of the government controller and that can form the basis of a cause of action against it. I argue that the ultimate controlling shareholder of SOEs – the government – should owe fiduciary duties to act in good faith in the public interest and to avoid unauthorised conflicts of interest. I further argue that the direct controlling shareholder of SOEs – the govern ment agency or the company that the government interposes between itself and the SOEs – should owe both first order fiduciary duties to the government (the ultimate controller) and second order fiduciary duties (which include acting in good faith in the public interest). Finally, I explore the implications of my arguments for climate change management and litigation. I show that the ultimate and direct government controlling shareholders may breach their fiduciary duties if they fail to address climate-related risks as part of their investment approaches, governance structures, monitoring actions, engagement practices and management of conflicts of interest. I then explain the benefits of having breach of fiduciary duties as a possible cause of action in climate change litigation.