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Nathalie Bravo
Intertax
Volume 47, Issue 8/9 (2019) pp. 693 – 714
https://doi.org/10.54648/taxi2019069
Abstract
Part VI of the MLI establishes the mandatory binding arbitration procedure. Since no consensus was reached among the participants in the BEPS Project on the adoption of the mandatory binding arbitration procedure as a mechanism to ensure the timely resolution of MAP cases, the treaty makers of the MLI designed flexible provisions for its implementation. Part VI of the MLI combines the use of optional provisions, alternative provisions and reservations. Thus, the question arises whether the MLI achieves a coordinated effect in regard to the implementation of the mandatory binding arbitration procedure, in spite of the high level of flexibility offered to its parties and signatories.
For answering this question, the article provides an in-depth analysis of the mandatory binding arbitration procedure adopted in the MLI and the policy reasons behind the decisions taken by the treaty makers to design the procedure in the form it is found in the MLI. Additionally, it illustrates how the mandatory binding arbitration procedure of Part VI of the MLI works with a focus on the effects of the reservation clauses and optional provisions that allow parties to customize the mandatory binding arbitration procedure. And, it explains how parties and signatories have availed themselves of the flexibility provided by the MLI in connection with the mandatory binding arbitration procedure.
Extract
Looking at the empirical data, English law and England as a forum are currently businesses’ prevailing choice for dispute resolution in international commercial transactions in Europe. This article analyses the factors determining businesses’ choice of contract law and forum in and the underlying mechanisms for businesses’ choices. These findings will be used to analyse what possible effects and consequences Brexit may have for the London commercial courts and the choice of English contract law. Will there be a switch of focus in approaching European commercial contracts and dispute resolution? Or will Brexit impact little on London’s prevailing position in the market for dispute resolution and the choice of English law in international commercial contracts?