Home > All journals > Common Market Law Review > 52(1) >
$25.00 - Rental (PDF) *
$49.00 - Article (PDF) *
Willem Bovenschen, Gijsbert Ter Kuile, Laura Wissink
Common Market Law Review
Volume 52, Issue 1 (2015) pp. 155 – 189
https://doi.org/10.54648/cola2015006
Abstract
Banking supervision within the euro zone has been placed in the hands of the European Central Bank in order to restore financial stability and aid economic recovery. This "Single Supervisory Mechanism" is an important step in further integrating the financial markets and indeed the European Union itself. The SSM creates new legal realities within EU law. In bolstering EU integration, a key question concerns the democratic legitimacy of the SSM. The article argues that different modes of accountability can be identified in the creation and operation of the SSM, of a political, administrative and judicial nature. This great variety leads to tailor-made accountability which keeps power in check while respecting the independence of the banking supervisors.
Extract
This article argues that the taxing right of market jurisdictions under Pillar One is justified by commonly invoked and widely accepted principles in international taxation. This is not just a desirable outcome of the international coordination on the allocation of taxing rights but a moral demand that the inter-state allocation of taxing rights must comply with. A principle-based allocation of taxing rights is a precondition for the legitimacy and thus the equity of the international tax regime. Principles, such as ability to pay, the benefits principle and economic allegiance, provide a normative justification for asserting tax jurisdiction. Despite the criticism regarding their vagueness, indeterminateness, and overlaps between their meaning, the benefits principle and economic allegiance have a definite function in the international tax regime insofar as they designate the countries that have a legitimate claim to tax international income.