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Fulvio Attinà, Marcello Carammia
European Foreign Affairs Review
Volume 29, Issue 3 (2024) pp. 275 – 294
https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2024013
Abstract
The EU’s foreign policy makers are committed to backing the rule-based international order and the creation of international law treaties to tackle global issues. The importance of world framework policies as the foundation of the current world order system that was created after the Second World War is overlooked by the rules-based concept of world order. Based on the High Representative’s strategy papers, this article assesses the views of EU foreign policy makers on world order, multipolarity, and multilateralism to understand the EU’s position in the current transition phase of the world order system. The article also addresses the significance of strategic autonomy as it appears as the core concept of the EU policy towards order transition. The analysis is based on International Relations (IR) scholarship and Complex Systems Theory (CST), which reveals gaps and inconsistencies in current EU views on the changing world order and the necessity to improve our understanding of how the world order transition is evolving.
Keywords
EU foreign and security policy, High Representative strategy papers, World order system, Order transition, World policymaking institutions, Priority collective problems, Framework world policies
Extract
These short remarks are slightly expanded from a text delivered at the Conference on Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Against Sovereigns, held at the University of Luxembourg on 10 January 2024. It sounds an extended note of caution against unthinking use of codifications in international law, and explains how reference to materials beyond influential projects such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and the Articles on the Responsibility of states for Internationally Wrongful Acts reveals a rather more complicated landscape than first appears when considering the enforcement of arbitral awards against states. I address briefly two examples: the enforceability of arbitral awards procured by fraud or corruption, and the rules for the resolution of treaty conflicts.
Journal of International Arbitration