The members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are still very reserved in pursuing cases and rather willing to seek traditional negotiating methods for settling their disputes. Decisions to engage in litigations are subject to numerous non-legal determinants. Moreover, many developing and least-developed WTO members face the problem of accessibility of the system provided by the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). Those states have been standing aside the DSU arena with no opportunity to enjoy the benefits of legal protection. Finally, affected private companies cannot access the DSU system, nor participate in procedures as third parties. Those entities always need to exert pressure on their governments to bring a claim and to obtain financial support for litigations. All those circumstances in the pre-litigation stage prevent effective delivery and distribution of justice in the WTO community. Therefore, the author proposes a reform of the DSU system by means of establishing a new central institution in the WTO – the ‘Independent Surveillance Body’ (ISB). This expert body would act as an institutional ex officio claimant empowered to survey the implementation of the WTO norms and to initiate procedures against members that violate the WTO law.