India’s National Crime Record Bureau’s report, ‘Crime in India’, stipulates that the conviction rate of economic crimes is only 29.4% which is way lesser than that of criminal conviction rate of 57%. Punitive measures under the Competition Act, 2002 are relatively less explored in the Indian context. This article is an attempt to examine the punitive measures in the Act, the evidence used for conviction and to see how the same deter the violators. An attempt is made to find out how the apex court in Rajasthan Cylinders case ( Rajasthan Cylinders and Containers Ltd v. UOI and Anr., 2018 SCC Online SC 1718.) might have diluted the already weak conviction rate of India. Artificial intelligence is used in many jurisdictions for cartel identification. The evidentiary standards in Indian jurisdiction in regard to cartel identification are almost equivalent to ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ instead of ‘preponderance of probability’. Need arises that the evidentiary jurisprudence of ‘reverse onus or reverse burden’, whereby shifting the burden of proof on the accused, should be used liberally in instances of anticompetitive practices. Did the apex court fail? If digital algorithms are there to guide and highlight the red flags in clandestine cartelization, how will the jurisdictions use them to counter the anti-competitive practices?