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Christian Neumeier
Common Market Law Review
Volume 60, Issue 2 (2023) pp. 319 – 344
https://doi.org/10.54648/cola2023023
Abstract
Following its latest Own Resources Decision, the European Union is equipped with a new fiscal policy instrument. In addition to its financing function, the Own Resources Decision can pursue policy objectives by linking the contribution burden of Member States to a political objective of the Union. The article presents the concept, function, and problems of this new category of political own resources and develops a legal framework to ensure that political own resources do not shift the institutional balance between the Council and the Parliament.
Keywords
Own Resources Decision, fiscal own resources, political own resources, Multiannual Financial Framework
Extract
World Trade Organization (WTO) judges are proposed by the WTO Secretariat and elected to act as ‘judges’ if either approved by the parties to a dispute, or, by the WTO Director-General in case no agreement between the parties has been possible. They are typically ‘Geneva crowd’, that is, they are either current or former delegates representing their country before the WTO. This observation holds for both first as well as second instance WTO judges (e.g., Panellists and members of the Appellate Body). In that, the WTO evidences an attitude strikingly similar to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Whereas the legal regime has been heavily ‘legalized’, the people called to enforce it remain the same.
Journal of World Trade