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Sejung Jung
Journal of World Trade
Volume 59, Issue 2 (2025) pp. 235 – 256
httpss://doi.org/10.54648/trad2025017
Abstract
This research examines
the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and relevant cases concerning the ‘domestic
industry’ definition in Article 4.1. It then empirically analyses how the Korea
Trade Commission (KTC) applies this concept in its anti-dumping investigations.
The WTO Agreement and disputed cases grant investigating authorities discretion
in defining the domestic industry. The KTC likewise exercises this discretion
in determining the scope of the domestic industry and interpreting relevant
provisions for excluding producers. However, this study identifies
inconsistencies in the KTC’s interpretation of the domestic industry,
particularly regarding industry representativeness. It also highlights the lack
of consistent standards in this interpretation. This research reveals that
while flexibility is permitted in defining the domestic industry, there are
concerns about the consistency and clarity of the KTC’s approach. This
ambiguity in interpretation and application of standards raises questions about
the effectiveness and fairness of KTC’s current approach in representing
domestic industries in anti-dumping investigations.
Keywords
WTO Ant-Dumping Agreement, Korean Customs Act, Korea Trade Commission, domestic industry, related producer, imported producer
Extract
In recent years, the world’s largest economies and traders – the United States, China, and Japan – have chosen to use measures affecting international trade as a means to achieve political objectives in contravention of the rules of international economic law and the practices of international trade established over several decades. Since the end of World War II, the world economy and international trade have rapidly expanded and prospered by achieving a degree of separation between international trade and political struggles under the rule-based international trading system, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its successor, the World Trade Organization. Thus, the recent misuses of trade measures by the world’s largest traders are alarming, because they undermine the stability of the world trading system, which has been maintained for the past several decades. This article accounts politically-motivated trade measures (‘PTMs’) recently invoked by the United States, China, and Japan, assesses their incompatibilities with the rules of international economic law, and also examines the risks that these PTMs pose to the world trading system.