Home > All journals > Journal of World Trade > 59(2) >
$25.00 - Rental (PDF) *
$49.00 - Article (PDF) *
Sejung Jung
Journal of World Trade
Volume 59, Issue 2 (2025) pp. 235 – 256
httpss://doi.org/10.54648/trad2025017
Abstract
This research examines
the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and relevant cases concerning the ‘domestic
industry’ definition in Article 4.1. It then empirically analyses how the Korea
Trade Commission (KTC) applies this concept in its anti-dumping investigations.
The WTO Agreement and disputed cases grant investigating authorities discretion
in defining the domestic industry. The KTC likewise exercises this discretion
in determining the scope of the domestic industry and interpreting relevant
provisions for excluding producers. However, this study identifies
inconsistencies in the KTC’s interpretation of the domestic industry,
particularly regarding industry representativeness. It also highlights the lack
of consistent standards in this interpretation. This research reveals that
while flexibility is permitted in defining the domestic industry, there are
concerns about the consistency and clarity of the KTC’s approach. This
ambiguity in interpretation and application of standards raises questions about
the effectiveness and fairness of KTC’s current approach in representing
domestic industries in anti-dumping investigations.
Keywords
WTO Ant-Dumping Agreement, Korean Customs Act, Korea Trade Commission, domestic industry, related producer, imported producer
Extract
Recent US statements calling for restoring a fully functioning World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system by 2024 have triggered a wave of optimism that the US blockade of the dispute system may finally be coming to an end. Due to US opposition, the WTO dispute system has been crippled since 2019 and unable to enforce WTO obligations, leaving the WTO in a crisis.
These optimistic sentiments are misplaced. Despite its reassuring rhetoric, the United States has no intention of restoring the dispute system to its full powers. The Biden administration boasts that it has adopted a new and transformative modern American industrial policy based on hundreds of billions of dollars in subsidies paid to the US semiconductor, electric vehicle, renewable energy, and other high technology industries. Key elements of this US industrial policy and US trade policies towards China violate US WTO obligations. A fully restored WTO dispute system will allow China, the European Union (EU) and other competitors to attack and overturn current US industrial and trade policies or subject the United States to massive financial penalties. To immunize US policies from attack, the United States wants and needs a WTO dispute system that remains disabled for the indefinite future, if not permanently.
Journal of World Trade