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Gu Bin
Journal of World Trade
Volume 51, Issue 3 (2017) pp. 409 – 423
https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2017016
Abstract
Within the sphere of multilateral development banks’ (MDB) dispute settlement, the accountability system is one stellar important development. It is essentially MDBs’ legal efforts to address complaints made by people adversely affected by an MDB-funded project. Such complaints arise from concerns with environmental and social implications, including involuntary resettlement and human rights violations. Under this system, Bank investigators assess Bank staff’s compliance (or noncompliance) with Bank operational policies and procedures relating to project design, appraisal and/or implementation. The World Bank’s Inspection Panel is a leading example for establishing a credible accountability culture and mechanism. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is the first MDB initiated by a group of Asian developing countries with China at the centre. The AIIB’s committed high standards can only be possible with a fair and effective accountability mechanism.
Extract
Under Regulation 1/2003, NCAs of EU Member States must apply Articles 101–102 TFEU to anti-competitive conducts with an effect on intra-Community trade, and must notify the Commission of investigations and envisaged decisions based on Articles 101–102 TFEU. In the last decade, the NCAs of the “new” EU Member States have notified a lower number of envisaged decisions in comparison to “old” EU Member State; this has been explained by the institutional constraints of the individual NCAs. However, the paper shows that the NCAs of the “new” EU Member States have not been “less active” in terms of enforcement, but have adopted most of their decisions under the national competition rules.Also, there is significant divergence in the assessment of the effect on trade by the NCAs of the selected jurisdictions. Some NCAs have not taken account of the relevant ECJ case law and the 2004 Commission Notice on the effect
Common Market Law Review